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Tuinenga: Log in to Danger Zone: Data Privacy Under The SCA and Microsoft

LOG IN TO THE DANGER ZONE: DATA
PRIVACY UNDER THE SCA AND MICROSOFT
I. INTRODUCTION
The year is 2018 and the United States government suspects Frank of
operating “Velvet Boulevard,” an elaborate and infamous black market
hosted over the dark web.1 Frank uses an email account and briefly visits
the United States. During his trip, Microsoft migrated Frank’s email data
to a server in Chicago to decrease the time it takes him to access his emails.
When Frank returned to his native land of Russia, his email data is again
migrated, but Microsoft may retain some of his subscriber information in
the United States. Assuming Microsoft re-migrates Frank’s data, § 2703(d)
of the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) empowers the government to
effortlessly compel Microsoft, the Internet service provider (“ISP”), to
hand over his stored non-content data no matter its location.2 Furious
This is a hypothetical scenario that is solely the work of the author. The facts of this
situation closely parallel the facts from In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 477
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) obligates domestic
Internet service providers (“ISPs”) to turn over to the government data located abroad on a
Microsoft server). The government sought email data stored by Microsoft and linked to an
unidentified individual’s account in relation to a federal criminal investigation. Id. at 467–
68. The government issued a warrant authorized by the SCA, compelling Microsoft to
retrieve the data and surrender it to the government. Id. Microsoft moved to quash the
warrant because the email data was located in Dublin, Ireland. Id. But see Matter of Warrant
to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp. v. United
States, 829 F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016) (invalidating the warrant approved by the lower courts
because the data was in Ireland); Joseph Cox, Court Rules to Extradite Suspected Silk Road
Admin
from
Ireland
to
the
US,
MOTHERBOARD
(Aug.
12,
2016),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/court-rules-to-extradite-suspected-silk-road-adminfrom-ireland-to-the-us [https://perma.cc/25SY-EFTT] (alleging that the unnamed
individual at the center of Microsoft is an operator of the notorious dark web organization
known as Silk Road). Recently, an Irish court approved the individual’s extradition to the
United States. Id.
2
See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) (providing the requirements
for a court order under the SCA). The statute states:
A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued
by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only
if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire
or electronic communication, or the records or other information
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.
In the case of a State governmental authority, such a court order shall
not issue if prohibited by the law of such State. A court issuing an order
pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by the service
provider, may quash or modify such order, if the information or records
requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with such
order otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider.
Id.
1
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over the United States’s data seizure, the Russian government refuses to
honor the United States’s extradition request.3 After a failed covert
operation by United States Special Forces to extract Frank from Moscow,
Russia dispatches warships to Chinese waters. Within hours, the eyes of
all humankind are upon what could be the beginning of the World War
III. Though this is an unlikely situation, it exists as an example of a worstcase scenario when domestic law enforcement spills over into the
international theatre.
Because Microsoft is already collecting all of Frank’s data for
advertisement purposes, the government’s task to obtain that data is
simple: obtain a SCA court order or subpoena.4 A SCA court order or
subpoena is unique because it allows the government and its agents to
obtain the non-content data of wire or electronic communications related
to a crime without physically traveling to the facility that houses the
information.5 This functionality is different from the traditional operation
of a search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
(“F.R.C.P.”) 41, which require the seized materials to be located in the
district that the warrant is issued.6 Despite the government’s nascent
ability to obtain data that is located abroad, the SCA does not expressly
authorize extraterritorial application of its mechanisms.7
Further, SCA § 2703(d) (“§ 2703”) empowers the government to
compel disclosure of non-content user data without proving probable
cause.8 Along with email, the government may compel disclosure of any
incidental records of stored electronic communication, including: bank
and hospital records, information stored in the cloud, information
transmitted via wearable health technology (“Fitbits”), or content

See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 477 (upholding a court order authorized by
SCA § 2703(d) (“§ 2703”) to compel disclosure of data controlled by Microsoft and stored in
Ireland).
4
See infra Part II.B (detailing how the government compels disclosure by ISPs through
mechanisms authorized in the SCA).
5
See infra Part II.B (examining the process by which the government obtains and executes
a court order under § 2703(d)).
6
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“[A] magistrate judge with authority in the district—or if
none is reasonably available, a judge of a state court of record in the district—has authority
to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property located within the
district . . . .”).
7
See infra Part II.B (discussing the specific text of the SCA regarding territorial limits on
jurisdiction and enforcement). Since Microsoft is a unique case involving extraterritorial
implications of data privacy, future courts, especially those not within the Second Circuit,
may choose to follow or ignore its principles. Id.
8
See infra Part II.B (providing a framework of the discreet mechanisms of § 2703 that
assign a specific standard of proof required to compel disclosure of different amounts of
customer data).
3
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accessed by a child on the family tablet.9 With the SCA, law enforcement
agencies enjoy unbridled access to data shared by millions of individuals
and stored by their ISPs on a daily basis.10
To fortify modern email privacy, this Note proposes an amendment
to § 2703(d) to restrict the federal government’s ability to compel
disclosure from ISPs. First, Part II explores the history and the language
of the SCA, the Microsoft case with respect to extraterritorial application
and the reduced standard of proof, and the recently enacted California
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“CalECPA”) by the California
legislature in an attempt to cure the issues with the current SCA apparent
in Microsoft.11 Next, Part III examines the constitutional weaknesses of the
SCA, assesses potential privacy issues users of stored communications
may face following Microsoft, analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of
the CalECPA, and proposes an amendment that integrates requirements
from the CalECPA into § 2703(d).12 Finally, Part IV recapitulates and
concludes this Note.13

9
See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 366 (2015) (examining
the scope of the SCA regarding real time and stored Google Chat and FaceTime data);
Matthew R. Langley, Hide Your Health: Addressing the New Privacy Problem of Consumer
Wearables, 103 GEO. L.J. 1641, 1644 (2015) (examining privacy concerns with data transmitted
by products such as Apple Watch and Fitbit); Steven R. Morrison, What the Cops Can’t Do,
Internet Service Providers Can: Preserving Privacy in Email Contents, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 253,
270 (2010) (concluding that ISPs may freely search and seize email data without being subject
to the constitutional limitations imposed on the government); Ned Schultheis, Warrants in
the Clouds: How Extraterritorial Application of the Stored Communications Act Threatens the
United States’ Cloud Storage Industry, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 661, 662 (2015)
(summarizing the corporate interests in cloud computing in the wake of Microsoft); Reema
Shah, Law Enforcement and Data Privacy: A Forward-Looking Approach, 125 YALE L.J. 543, 553–
54 (2015) (discussing that companies including Facebook and WhatsApp voiced concerns
regarding the government’s reach under the SCA).
10
See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide
to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1211 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, User’s Guide]
(noting that the government does not need to prove probable cause to compel disclosure of
a wide array of data); Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633, 664
(2016) (noting that consumers today expect technology to resist modern surveillance
techniques).
11
See infra Part III.B–D (expounding on the relationship between the Fourth Amendment,
the SCA, Microsoft, and the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(“CalECPA”)).
12
See infra Part III.C (examining privacy issues resulting from Microsoft and potential
solutions observable in the CalECPA).
13
See infra Part IV (concluding that constitutional considerations should be added to
§ 2703(d)).
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II. BACKGROUND
How far the U.S. government’s authority extends in bringing
criminals to justice is often an issue of legal and scholarly debate.14 Today,
the government compels ISPs to disclose individual users’ data under the
authority of the SCA.15 In 2014, the Southern District of New York
attempted to compel Microsoft to disclose email data stored in Ireland
under the SCA in In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled
& Maintained by Microsoft Corporation.16 Recently, the Second Circuit
overturned the Southern District of New York in what is already being
haled as a landmark ruling for data privacy.17 Still, Microsoft sparked
14
See TianRui Grp. Co. Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(finding the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) had authority to regulate conduct
concerning intellectual property occurring in China); Kerrilyn Russ, On the Wrong Side of the
Tracks: An Analysis of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Non-Application of the
Presumption against Extraterritoriality [TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 132
(Fed. Cir. 2011)], 52 WASHBURN L.J. 685, 695–98 (2013) (examining TianRui and resultant
arguments for and against limiting the reach of the government through the ITC); Viki
Economides, TianRui Group Co. v. International Trade Commission: The Dubious Status of
Extraterritoriality and the Domestic Industry Requirement of Section 337, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 1235,
1245 (2012) (cautioning extraterritorial application of the ITC’s domestic regulatory authority
due to international considerations).
15
See infra Part II.B (summarizing the provisions of § 2703); see also Deirdre K. Mulligan,
Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1566 (2004) (concluding the Wiretap
Act, the Pen Register Statute, and the SCA all function similarly with respect to email by
generally prohibiting unsanctioned disclosure of information while providing exceptions,
such as compelling an ISP to turn over data related to a criminal investigation).
16
See 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (upholding the government’s SCA warrant
and requiring Microsoft to retrieve and surrender email content data in a storage facility in
Dublin); see also Russell Hsiao, Implications for the Future of Global Data Security and Privacy:
The Territorial Application of the Stored Communications Act and the Microsoft Case, 24 CATH.
U.J.L. & TECH. 215, 240–41 (2015) (describing the potential global effects of Microsoft in that
the United States and Ireland maintain a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (“MLAT”) that
normally governs international requests for persons or property).
17
See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016) (concluding that
Congress did not intend for the SCA’s warrant provisions to apply extraterritorially); see also
Jonathan Stempel, Microsoft Wins Landmark Appeal over Seizure of Foreign Emails, REUTERS (July
14, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-usa-warrant-idUSKCN0ZU1RJ
[https://perma.cc/X9Y4-HK4N] (framing the 3–0 decision by the 2nd Circuit Court of
Appeals as a defeat for the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and a victory for privacy advocates
and technology companies). Dozens of technology companies filed briefs leading up to the
appeal, including Amazon, Apple, Cisco Systems, and CNN. Id. See also Sam Thielman, US
Cannot Force Microsoft to Hand over Emails Stored Abroad, Court Rules, GUARDIAN (July 14,
2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/14/microsoft-emails-courtruling-us-government [https://perma.cc/W9NJ-DDE7] (conveying the wishes of Brad
Smith, president and chief legal counsel for Microsoft, that the ruling would usher in new
legislative discussion of digital privacy). Smith stated, “[t]he U.S. government has a decision
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discussion on both the government’s territorial warrant authority
according to F.R.C.P. 41 regarding searches and seizures and the
appropriate standard of proof the government must show to compel
disclosure of email data.18 Against this backdrop, California enacted a
state-specific analog to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(“ECPA”) in October of 2015, including a corresponding SCA signifying a
shift in future laws governing a globally connected world.19
First, Part II.A discusses the geographic origins of the Fourth
Amendment and the cases forming this framework. 20 Next, Part II.B offers
an account of the legislative development of the SCA with regard to
communications privacy.21 Then, Part II.C explores two key cases that
defined email privacy expectations pursuant to the SCA.22 Finally, Part
II.D presents recent legislation enacted by California in an attempt to
resolve the lingering questions of data privacy under the SCA.23

to make: we can even [sic] spend the next two years arguing about a law that was passed
thirty years ago, or we can talk about a law that is focused on the future.” Id.
18
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (restricting the government’s ability to conduct searches and
seizures on citizens). The Amendment mandates:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“[a] magistrate judge with authority in the district . . . has
authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property located within the
district . . .”); Joy L. Backer, Stop Waiting on the World to Change: Compelled Disclosure of Email
Content under the Stored Communications Act, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 397 (2015) (arguing
the Supreme Court must rein in the authority of the SCA by requiring probable cause for all
warrants seeking email correspondence).
19
See Larry Magid, California Electronic Communications Privacy Act Protects Privacy AND
Children, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/larrymagid/california-electronic-com_b_8101848.html
[https://perma.cc/4C2S-QQWS]
(reporting the CalECPA strengthens privacy expectations of email users and helps further
protect children from online abuse); In Landmark Victory for Digital Privacy, Gov. Brown Signs
California Electronic Communication Privacy Act into Law, ACLU OF N. CAL. (Oct. 8, 2015),
https://www.aclunc.org/news/landmark-victory-digital-privacy-gov-brown-signscalifornia-electronic-communications-privacy [https://perma.cc/TSY8-R2P9] [hereinafter
Landmark] (announcing the passage of CalECPA and its aim to secure data privacy for
Californians); see also Jim Halpert & Michelle Anderson, BNA Insights: State Privacy &
Security Developments—Looking Back and Looking Ahead, 20 ELECTRONIC COMM. L. REP. 8, 19
(2015) (examining the proposed CalECPA before its enactment and initial public reaction).
20
See infra Part II.A (introducing the origins of the Fourth Amendment).
21
See infra Part II.B (examining the SCA and its problematic provisions).
22
See infra Part II.C (summarizing United States v. Warshak and Microsoft).
23
See infra Part II.D (presenting the history and text of the CalECPA as a state statute
focused primarily on individual privacy).
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A. The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Data
Before the 1950s, courts primarily limited the protections of the Bill of
Rights to apply only within the national and territorial borders.24 Searches
and seizures conducted by the government primarily concerned the
physical world.25 For example, in Blackmer v. United States, the
government served a subpoena on a U.S. citizen living in Paris, France,
compelling him to return to the United States to testify in relation to a
criminal investigation. 26 Blackmer claimed because he was outside of
United States jurisdiction, he was not subject to its laws or demands.27 The
Supreme Court found that because Blackmer retained U.S. citizenship, the
United States retained jurisdiction over him. 28 Blackmer expanded the
24
See United States v. Dorr, 23 S. Ct. 859, 864 (1900) (holding the constitutional right to a
jury trial does not extend to non-U.S. citizens living in a territory acquired by the United
States). The Court stated that citizens of the Philippines were entitled to basic individual
rights “by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution,” but not a right to a trial by
jury. Id. See also Territory of Haw. v. Mankichi, 21 U.S. 787, 791 (1903) (finding the right to
a habeas corpus hearing does not extend to inhabitants of the territory of Hawaii); see also
Emlin McClain, The Hawaiian Case, 17 HARV. L. REV. 386, 387–88 (1904) (elaborating upon the
distinctions between provisions of the Bill of Rights as applied to different classes of U.S.
territories); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285,
292 (2015) [hereinafter Kerr, Global Internet] (describing the nexus between the geographic
location of the individual or materials and the corresponding level of Fourth Amendment
protection).
25
See Search, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 672 (10th ed. 2014) (categorizing a search as: “[a]n
examination of a person’s body, property, or other area that the person would reasonably be
expected to consider as private, conducted by a law enforcement officer for the purpose of
finding evidence of a crime”); Seizure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 678 (10th ed. 2014) (defining
seizure as: “[t]he act or instance of taking possession of a person or property by legal right
or process; esp. a . . . confiscation or arrest that may interfere with a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy”); see also Amy E. Pope, Lawlessness Breeds Lawlessness: A Case for
Applying the Fourth Amendment to Extraterritorial Searches, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1917, 1919 (2013)
(suggesting a rise in transactional organized crime led the government to blur the lines
between territorial and extraterritorial searches under the Fourth Amendment); Backer, supra
note 18, at 382 (noting the language of the Fourth Amendment focuses on physical intrusions
similar to those imposed by British soldiers onto American colonists); Daskal, supra note 9,
at 336 (laying out the foundation of the pre-Internet Fourth Amendment that relied heavily
on the physical location of either the individual or materials to be searched); Kerr, User’s
Guide, supra note 10, at 1209 (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s origination as a protection
of the physical home).
26
See 284 U.S. 421, 443 (1932) (upholding a contempt decree of a U.S. citizen for failing to
return to the United States after being served a subpoena in France). The court noted the
interaction between a U.S. court and one of its citizens involves only those two parties, even
if the citizen is located in another country. Id. at 437.
27
See id. at 436 (summarizing Blackmer’s location-based argument).
28
See id. (finding the government may look abroad to bring wrongdoers to justice but
must do so in accordance with the Constitution); Ronald S. Betman & Jonathan R. Law, The
(Too) Long Arm of the S.E.C.: When a Foreign Employee of a U.S.-Based Multinational Financial
Services Client is Threatened with a Subpoena, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 10 (2013) (positing
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government’s capability to regulate private activity occurring outside of
the United States.29 As demonstrated in Blackmer, geographic location
dominated Fourth Amendment analyses before the creation of the
Internet.30 In 1967, the Court handed down another landmark decision in
Katz v. United States, finding that the government must obtain a warrant
supported by probable cause to conduct surveillance on a public
telephone booth.31 There, the government sought wiretap content linked
to a particular telephone booth. 32 In his concurring opinion, Justice John
Marshall Harlan advanced the “reasonable expectation of privacy”
standard under the Fourth Amendment and articulated a two-prong test
for determining whether the government must obtain a warrant before
tapping a phone.33
individuals retain certain constitutional rights abroad because the government must still go
through specific processes to compel an individual’s return).
29
See Robert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 196 (1932) (describing the early rationales for pursuing criminals located beyond
a nation’s borders); Kevin A. Meehan, The Continuing Conundrum of International Internet
Jurisdiction, 31 B.C. INTL. & COMP. L. REV. 345, 347 (2008) (citing the nation’s ability to exert
power over a citizen regardless of location as a prelude to early international Internet
regulations).
30
See Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 438 (implementing geography as a key factor in determining
whether U.S. courts retain jurisdiction over individuals); P. Sean Morris, “War Crimes”
against Privacy—the Jurisdiction of Data and International Law, 17 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 36 (2016)
(describing the jurisdictional debate in Microsoft as the clashing of two legal cultures); see also
Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10, at 1209 (connecting the right to privacy to the right to
property in terms of the expectation against unreasonable intrusions). The most hallowed
example of property is one’s home. Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10, at 1209. Because most
property is tangible, an intrusion close in proximity to one’s property results in a violation
of one’s personal privacy. Id.
31
See 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding the Fourth Amendment protects the use of public
pay phones); see also Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the
Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 35 (2004) (summarizing the thrust of Katz as a bright line test
as to which communications are protected by the Constitution and which are not); Katz v.
United States, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/35 [https://perma.cc/QWK8MVE8] [hereinafter OYEZ] (showing Katz was a seven to one decision). Justice Thurgood
Marshall did not participate in the arguments or ruling. OYEZ, supra note 31. See generally
Johnathan Chait, Will the Supreme Court Just Disappear?, N.Y. MAG., (Feb. 21, 2016),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/02/will-the-supreme-court-justdisappear.html [https://perma.cc/YGG8-EGYW] (reporting Justice Antonin Scalia’s vacant
Supreme Court seat leaves many controversial cases in limbo, where even if the Court
renders a decision, any controversial decision would result in a 4–4 stalemate). This result,
in essence, negates the Supreme Court even rendering a decision at all. Id.
32
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (summarizing the government’s argument that wiretap
surveillance involves no physical intrusion of the telephone booth, and thus, no
constitutional concern). Responding to the fact that a telephone booth is a public area, the
Court stated, “what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.” Id. at 351.
33
See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“There is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
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Despite the expectation of privacy advanced in Katz, exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment, such as the third-party doctrine, allow warrantless
government surveillance.34 According to the third-party doctrine, the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to information voluntarily disclosed
to third parties if the third party in question has an independent, usually
business, interest in receiving information from an individual. 35 In
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Limited, the Supreme Court defined the
territorial reach of third-party subpoenas and warrants.36 In Morrison, the
government sought documents controlled by National Australia Bank
(“the Bank”) under the authority of the Securities and Exchange Act.37 The
Bank moved to quash the subpoena because the Securities and Exchange
Act ambiguously references extraterritorial application of its provisions.38
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). Justice John Marshall Harlan
noted that a telephone booth resembles a home for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that
warrantless electronic surveillance may violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. See also Daniel
Benoliel, Law, Geography and Cyberspace: The Case of On-Line Territorial Privacy, 23 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 176–77 (2005) (applying the reasonable expectation of privacy advanced
in Katz to Internet activity in the twenty-first century); Jayni Foley, Are Google Searches
Private? An Originalist Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Online Communication Cases,
22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 447, 455 (2007) (examining Justice Harlan’s concurrence from an
originalist standpoint and describing when the government may justify an invasion of
personal privacy); Dr. Saby Ghoshray, The Emerging Reality of Social Media: Erosion of
Individual Privacy through Cyber-Vetting and Law’s Inability to Catch Up, 12 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 551, 569 (2013) (highlighting the second prong of the standard advanced by
Justice Harlan and arguing society today believes email privacy is reasonable).
34
See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 568–69 (2009)
[hereinafter Kerr, Third-Party] (examining the origin of the third-party doctrine regarding
undercover informants’ use of concealed recording devices); Jacob M. Small, Storing
Documents in the Cloud: Toward an Evidentiary Privilege Protecting Papers and Effects Stored on
the Internet, 23 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 255, 271 (2013) (summarizing arguments in favor
of the third-party doctrine); but see Jace C. Gatewood, It’s Raining Katz and Jones: The
Implications of United States v. Jones-A Case of Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REV. 683, 712–13
(2013) (suggesting application of the third-party doctrine to electronic communications poses
deep constitutional and policy concerns because a great deal of data is submitted
unintentionally).
35
See Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1576–77 (discussing the basic principles behind the thirdparty doctrine as a means of obtaining an individual’s business records voluntarily
submitted to a third party, such as a bank); see also Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise
of the Fourth Amendment Third-Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 50 (2011) (suggesting
courts recognize an exception to the third-party doctrine for online communications if the
message is reasonably necessary to meaningfully participate in society).
36
See 561 U.S. 247, 269 (2010) (holding that the Securities and Exchange Commission may
only regulate domestic transactions).
37
See id. at 250 (emphasizing the Bank was a foreign entity with no connection to the
United States).
38
See id. at 268 (finding that based on the text and legislative history of a specific section
of the Securities and Exchange Act, its provisions apply only to transactions occurring in the
United States); Peta Spender & Michael Tarlowski, Adventures on the Barbary Coast: Morrison
and Enforcement in a Globalised Securities Market, 35 MELB. U.L. REV. 280, 298 (2011) (critiquing
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The Court denied the government’s request for the documents and found
that the “[t]he presumption against extraterritoriality prescribes when a
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has
none.”39 The tradition of the third-party doctrine leaves uncertainty
regarding what privacy assurances courts will extend to email and other
data.40
Data is distinguishable from tangible objects in many ways. 41 User
data can be hidden and the owner may be disguised using sophisticated
codes from anywhere in the world. 42 The user can access emails without
being anywhere near where that data is stored.43 For example, unlike a
post card, a single sent email generally exists in many locations at once. 44
Morrison after balancing the importance of foreign and domestic matters between nations);
Elizabeth A. Rowe & Daniel M. Mahfood, Trade Secrets, Trade, and Extraterritoriality, 66 ALA.
L. REV. 63, 65 (2014) (approaching the challenges that corporations face when seeking judicial
enforcement of court orders issued within the United States).
39
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269 (finding the presumption against extraterritoriality
necessary for resolving national and international disputes in an orderly manner). Courts
are not to contrarily interpret statutes contemplated and passed by Congress. Id. See also S.
Nathan Williams, The Sometimes “Craven Watchdog”: The Disparate Criminal-Civil Application
of the Presumption against Extraterritoriality, 63 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1398–99 (2014) (expanding on
the presumption against extraterritoriality in civil and criminal contexts).
40
Compare United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418–19 (App. Armed Forces 1996)
(holding that an individual enjoys Fourth Amendment protection of remotely stored
America Online, Inc. (“AOL”) emails and rejecting the required disclosure rationale), with
Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. 2001) (finding that defendant’s
emails and chat room activity did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy); see also Ryan
Walsh, Extraterritorial Confusion: The Complex Relationship Between Bowman and Morrison and
a Revised Approach to Extraterritoriality, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 627, 642 (2013) [hereinafter Walsh,
Extraterritoriality] (noticing a revival of the presumption against extraterritoriality and
providing specific national security exceptions to protect the country in a complex global
environment).
41
See Sherry F. Colb, What Is A Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine
and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 134 (2002) (discussing how public and
private considerations factor into data’s Fourth Amendment protection); David R. Johnson
& David Post, Law and Borders-the Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1396–97
(1996) (examining the separation of subsidiary spheres or levels within the Internet).
42
See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 551 (2005)
[hereinafter Kerr, Digital World] (finding many investigators prefer to copy an individual’s
data via bitstream and review the copies rather than the originals).
43
See Daskal, supra note 9, at 368 (describing the divisibility of data as both a convenience
and a hazard for the individual user).
44
See Schultheis, supra note 9, at 688 (stating the main enticement for cloud data storage
is that it is accessible to the user anywhere Internet is available); see also Paul Schiff Berman,
The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 344–45 (2002) (noting some states,
California for example, regulate certain types of email transactions and tobacco
advertisements); but see Kerr, Digital World, supra note 42, at 551 (“[A] search occurs when
information from or about the data is exposed to possible human observation, such as when
it appears on a screen, rather than when it is copied by the hard drive or processed by the
computer.”).
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Finally, law enforcement may search and seize data without physically
traveling to a storage facility.45 Scholars suggest updating the laws that
govern third-party disclosure of personal electronic data to more
realistically mirror the unique features of intangible data. 46
Personal information transmitted via email, including bank and
hospital records, traverses numerous third-party servers while being
copied at each juncture.47 Today, data transmitted while using Gmail or

45
See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating the government
attempted to compel disclosure of data located in Ireland); Jason Young Green, Railing against
Cyber Imperialism: Discussing the Issues Surrounding the Pending Appeal of United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 172, 187–88 (2015) (discussing the hybrid nature of
the SCA warrant initially granted in Microsoft); Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation
Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 376 (2014) [hereinafter Kerr, Next
Generation] (suggesting Congress enacted the Electronic Communication Privacy Act
(“ECPA”) in a time when data storage was expensive whereas today, ISPs may store the
entirety of an individual’s user data for a relatively low cost). Kerr claims this inversion led
to mass storage of data which “renders [the] ECPA’s structure exactly backwards for the
operation of modern computer networks.” Kerr, Next Generation, supra note 45, at 376.
46
See Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1571 (summarizing the problems caused by the thirdparty doctrine within the SCA); see also Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and
Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753 (2005)
[hereinafter Solove, Codification] (stating the third-party doctrine encompasses companies,
like Amazon, that store troves of revealing user information). Solove further posits that
courts are hesitant to stray from a narrow analysis as to whether particular law enforcement
practices pose constitutional risks. Id. at 774. See Wei Chen Lin, Where Are Your Papers?: The
Fourth Amendment, the Stored Communications Act, the Third-Party Doctrine, the Cloud, and
Encryption, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 1093, 1127 (2016) (analyzing the arguments for and against
strong encryption as a data privacy measure); but see Kerr, Third-Party, supra note 34, at 573
(arguing the third-party doctrine maintains the technological neutrality of the Fourth
Amendment).
47
See Simon M. Baker, Unfriending the Stored Communications Act: How Technological
Advancement and Legislative Inaction Have Rendered its Protections Obsolete, 22 DEPAUL J. ART,
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 103–104 (2011) (predicting how recent court decisions treating
opened emails will affect Facebook and MySpace messages as in remote storage); Eric R.
Hinz, A Distinctionless Distinction: Why the RCS/ECS Distinction in the Stored Communications
Act Does Not Work, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 493 (2012) (offering an example of early
problems with the term storage when a hospital wishes to keep a copy of some electronic
data for back-up purposes, but does not consider that data in storage). While the individual
may wish for this information to remain private, the third-party doctrine removes any
expectation of privacy. Id. See also Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the Loss of
Something a Lot Like Privacy: An Examination of the “Mosaic Theory” and the Limits of the Fourth
Amendment, 24 SAINT THOMAS L. REV. 169, 240 (2012) [hereinafter Walsh, Mosaic] (suggesting
Congress enacted the SCA at least in part to counteract increasing government collection of
personal data). Today, because the government is capable of numerous and distinct forms
of surveillance, the data from each of these forms may be aggregated into one singular
account, much like a mosaic in the world of art. Id. at 173. If the government does collect a
mosaic of information, the Fourth Amendment protects that information. Id.
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Facebook is also generally subject to the third-party doctrine.48 The sum
of an individual’s data usage across all of these services give the
investigator a “mosaic” of private information. 49 Individuals consider
their personal information as private, not just to other individuals, but also
to the government.50 Data’s quirks, even in 1986, led Congress to create a
basic framework of Fourth Amendment protections.51
B. Enactment of the SCA as Part of the ECPA
Initial widespread use of the Internet began with businesses using
desktop or laptop computers connected to private servers.52 Yet, outside
the office, few people accessed the Internet for non-business reasons or
even owned personal computers during this time. 53 In short, personal

48
See Avidan Y. Cover, Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the Populist Fourth Amendment,
100 IOWA L. REV. 1441, 1445 (2015) (discussing the common email and social media services
used today that are subject to the third-party doctrine); Daniel Shickich, What Your Tweet
Doesn’t Say: Twitter, Non-Content Data, and the Stored Communications Act, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH.
& ARTS 457, 461 (2013) (analyzing privacy expectations when the user completes a clickwrap
consent form before utilizing Internet services).
49
See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010) (“In short, ‘account’ is an
apt word for the conglomeration of stored messages that comprises an email account, as it
provides an account of its owner’s life.”); see also Walsh, Mosaic, supra note 47, at 173
(describing the government’s surveillance capabilities when aggregating data across
services).
50
See Hinz, supra note 47, at 489 (introducing privacy concerns from the standpoint of an
investigation involving the Detroit police department and mayor following the police
shooting of Tamara Greene in 2003); Jay P. Kesan et al., Information Privacy and Data Control
in Cloud Computing: Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market Efficiency, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 341, 460 (2013) (suggesting data privacy laws should be narrowly tailored to fit specific
circumstances and predicting reduced privacy expectations for data stored in the cloud).
51
See supra Part II.B (examining the legislative response to slowly increasing Internet use
during the time Congress contemplated the SCA).
52
See Courtney M. Bowman, A Way Forward after Warshak: Fourth Amendment Protections
for E-Mail, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809, 825 (2012) (arguing that the SCA was crafted as a bill
to protect a business convenience, not personal privacy considerations); Sasha Segall,
Jurisdictional Challenges in the United States Government’s Move to Cloud Computing Technology,
23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1105, 1115 (2013) (stating that numerous ISPs
today operate storage facilities outside of the United States); see also Matthew Tokson,
Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 584 (2011) (examining early
government use of bank and telephone company records); Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1560
(discussing that few individuals had home access to the Internet in the 1980s because
personal computers were large and expensive). Those that did have access to personal
computers had minimal options when seeking ISPs. Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1560; Kerr,
Global Internet, supra note 24, at 287 (noting initial Internet use in the United States was
primarily domestic).
53
See William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy under the Stored
Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1197 (2010) (revealing that an IBM mainframe cost $12
million in 1970); Schultheis, supra note 9, at 666–67 (reporting fourteen percent of Americans
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Internet usage in 1986 pales in comparison to today.54 Despite its minimal
usage, individuals and civil rights groups quickly began to voice Internet
privacy concerns.55 Because the Fourth Amendment protects “people, not
places,” legislators were at odds in determining whether stored electronic
communications should be afforded the same reasonable expectation of
privacy as a telephone booth. 56 Particularly, legislators examined
extending the government’s reach beyond the United States’s borders.57
used the Internet in 1995, while sixty-six percent of Americans used the Internet in 2005, and
eighty-seven percent of Americans used the Internet in 2014).
54
See Terri A. Cutrera, The Constitution in Cyberspace: The Fundamental Rights of Computer
Users, 60 UMKC L. REV. 139, 141 (1991) (marking a sharp increase in hacking activity as
computer and communications technologies progressed); Robert W. Kastenmeier et al.,
Communications Privacy: A Legislative Perspective, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 715, 718 (1989)
(enumerating available communications technologies, such as cordless telephones, paging
devices, and miniature cameras). The government wished to protect these communications
while providing certain exceptions for when the ISP may be subject to disclosure. Id. at 719.
See Aaron Smith, 15% of American Adults Have Used Online Dating Sites or Mobile Dating Apps,
PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/02/11/15-percent-ofamerican-adults-have-used-online-dating-sites-or-mobile-dating-apps/ [https://perma.cc/
7Q3W-PYE7] (reporting that usage by eighteen to twenty-four year olds has increased nearly
300% since 2013). Usage of dating sites or mobile dating apps for fifty-five to sixty-four year
olds has doubled. Id.
55
See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1264, 1274 (2004) [hereinafter Solove, Surveillance Law] (mentioning the government used
COINTELPRO, an early surveillance program operated with minimal oversight, on Civil
Rights activists who demanded, among other things, individual privacy); Mulligan, supra
note 15, at 1561–62 (explaining that before the SCA, stored communications were not
protected by any federal legislation).
56
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (defining the scope of the Fourth
Amendment in terms of telephone communications); S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986) reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555 (“Most importantly, the law must advance with the technology to
ensure the continued vitality of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”); see also Orin S. Kerr,
Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1609–10 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, Cybercrime] (distinguishing the process
of identifying property rights of tangible materials to assigning property rights to intangible
data); but see Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10, at 1209 (explaining email data is traditionally
stored on the premises of the ISP and not within the home or physical control of the
individual). Individual users may believe stored emails to be part of their virtual home, but
those messages are stored on the premises of the ISP. Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10, at
1209. See also Solove, Surveillance Law, supra note 55, at 1270–71 (noting the surveillance of
telegraph communications as a guide when Congress contemplated applying the Fourth
Amendment to online correspondence).
57
See H.R. Rep. 99–647, at 32–33 (1986) (denying extraterritorial application of the SCA to
seize data located outside the territorial United States). The report reflects:
By the inclusion of the element “affecting (affects) interstate or foreign
commerce” in these provisions the Committee does not intend that the
Act regulate activities conducted outside the territorial United States.
Thus, insofar as the Act regulates the “interception” of communications,
for example it . . . regulates only those “interceptions” conducted within
the territorial United States. Similarly, the controls in [Section 2703]
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Ultimately, Congress sought to ensure basic privacy rights of individuals
using electronic communication by enacting the SCA as a subordinate title
of the ECPA.58
Three main titles comprise the ECPA: the Wiretap Act, the Pen
Register Statute, and the SCA.59 The Wiretap Act oversees the collection
of content data whereas the Pen Register Statute applies to non-content
data.60 The Wiretap Act and Pen Register Statute enable the government
to intercept email content in real time. 61 Based on how the data is
transmitted, § 2703 splits all stored communications data into two
categories: electronic communication services (“ECS”) and remote
computing services (“RCS”).62 Section 2703(a) pertains to the disclosure
of ECS data while § 2703(b) applies to RCS data.63 An individual uses ECS

Id.

regarding access to stored wire and electronic communications are
intended to apply only to access within the territorial United States.

See Kerr, Next Generation, supra note 45, at 384 (positing in the 1980s, Congress focused
on protecting content rather than non-content data). Unopened messages stored less than
180 days received the highest protection while non-content received minimal consideration.
Id. at 384–85. See also Kerr, Cybercrime, supra note 56, at 1602–03 (offering early court cases
involving government requests for individual user data primarily involved child
pornography).
59
See generally Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012) (authorizing collection of content data
in criminal investigations); Pen Register Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2012) (permitting
disclosure of non-content communications in relation to an “ongoing criminal investigation”
conducted by a governmental agency); § 2703 (allowing compelled disclosure of stored
communications data).
60
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (informing the subject
and body of an email message comprises content data while the addressee, time sent, sender
location, and other logistical information comprise non-content email data). Because the
Wiretap Act authorizes real-time surveillance, a much more detailed warrant is required
than under the SCA. Id. at 469. The distinction blurs between what statute a given search
warrant, subpoena, or court order falls under when the government wishes to conduct
multiple forms of surveillance. Id.
61
See Kerr, Next Generation, supra note 45, at 376 (stating the majority of privacy
protections established in the ECPA were aimed at real-time surveillance). When Congress
enacted the ECPA, the government primarily conducted surveillance in real-time and rarely
seized stored information, while today the opposite is true. Id.
62
See generally § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider
of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic communication,
that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred and
eighty days or less . . . .”); § 2703(b) (“A governmental entity may require a provider of
remote computing service to disclose the contents of any wire or electronic
communication . . . .”).
63
See § 2703(a) (describing the 180-day time limit); § 2703(b) (allowing compelled
disclosure of stored data); see also People v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 596 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
2012) (finding that Twitter is primarily an electronic communication service (“ECS”)
provider, and records associated with a Twitter account are subject to subpoena according
to the SCA); In re United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214 (D. Or. 2009) (categorizing stored
emails as data under control of a remote computing service (“RCS”) provider for the
58
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when sending and receiving emails and uses RCS to store messages once
they are opened.64 The type of service provided and whether the data has
been in storage for more than 180 days determines what mechanism the
government must employ to compel disclosure under § 2703.65
Section 2703 erects a tapering system controlling the conditions under
which ISPs must disclose data to the government.66 First, the government
may seek basic user and transactional information with an administrative
subpoena authorized by § 2703(c).67 Second, non-content records may be
obtained by a court order found in § 2703(d).68 To obtain this court order,
the government must demonstrate “specific and articulable facts”
showing there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the information in
question is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”
rather than probable cause.69 Also according to § 2703(d), the government
purposes of determining the appropriate mechanism to employ under the SCA); Hinz, supra
note 47, at 515 (mentioning many interfaces today combine ECS and RCS services, making
classification of messages difficult). Hinz offers the example of two professors collaborating
on a single document saved in Dropbox. Hinz, supra note 47, at 515. The professors each use
a RCS to store the document and an ECS to make edits over the Internet. Id.
64
See Hinz, supra note 47, at 496 (establishing the process of sending and receiving an
email involves electronic computing services while remote computing services store the
message once the message is read and stored).
65
See Backer, supra note 18, at 390 (stating the greatest level of protection available is for
electronic communications stored in an ECS for less than 180 days); see also Hinz, supra note
47, at 496 (explaining since the SCA only distinguishes between ECS and RCS providers
despite numerous technological advances since 1986, courts must determine what type of
service requires what level of privacy protection on a case by case basis). An ISP may offer
both ECS and RCS services, so while during an exchange the ISP may stay the same, the legal
requirements of that ISPs conduct in handling data change when the nature of the service
switches from ECS to RCS. Hinz, supra note 47, at 496. For example, per the SCA, ISPs may
not voluntarily disclose ECS data to other parties at any time; whereas, ISPs are prohibited
from disclosing RCS data only if that ISP is not allowed to access the communication for
reasons other than storage and processing. Id.
66
See generally § 2703 (creating three tiers of data available via disclosure under the SCA);
see also Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2016) (summarizing the
methods by which the government may compel disclosure of minimally distinct types of
data under the SCA).
67
See § 2703(c)(1)(a) (requiring an ISP to disclose “a record or other information pertaining
to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . . only when the governmental entity: obtains
a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure . . . .”).
68
See § 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be
issued . . . if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that . . . the
contents of a wire or electronic communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.”).
69
See id. (enumerating the specific and articulable facts standard); see also Kaitlin G.
Klamann, Show Me the Warrant: Protection of Stored Electronic Communications in New York
State, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1407, 1422 (2014) (explaining that the distinctions found in the
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may seek some user content with a subpoena under § 2703(c)(2) or a
§ 2703(d) order provided the government gives notice to the ISP’s
customer.70 Finally, the government may obtain “priority stored
communications”—stored communications held by the ISP for less than
180 days and stored communications in storage for more than 180 days—
the government must prove probable cause and obtain a search warrant
authorized by § 2703(a), unless the government is seeking data older than
180 days and provides notice to the customer.71
Warrants authorized by § 2703(a) are subject to the F.R.C.P., while
subpoenas and court orders found in §§ 2703(b) and 2703(c) are not.72
SCA turn on the type of service provider and the status of the data, i.e., whether an email has
been opened); Backer, supra note 18, at 399 (criticizing the specific and articulable facts
standard); Schultheis, supra note 9, at 669 (citing limited distinctions between the function of
an SCA warrant and an ordinary subpoena).
70
See § 2703(b)(1) (allowing disclosure with or without notice to the customer). The
statute states:
A governmental entity may require a provider of remote computing
service to disclose the contents of any wire or electronic
communication . . . without required notice to the subscriber or
customer . . . or with prior notice from the governmental entity to the
subscriber or customer if the governmental entity:
uses an
administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a
Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena[.]
Id. See also § 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be
issued . . . if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that . . . the
contents of a wire or electronic communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.”).
71
See § 2703(a) (providing the warrant provision of the SCA’s disclosure capabilities). The
statute states:
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of
electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic
communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only
pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court,
issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent
jurisdiction. A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
provider of electronic communications services of the contents of a wire
or electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an
electronic communications system for more than one hundred and
eighty days by the means available under subsection (b) of this section.
Id. See § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i) (“A governmental entity may require a provider of remote
computing service to disclose the contents of any wire or electronic
communication . . . without required notice to the subscriber or customer . . . .”); Microsoft
Corp., 829 F.3d at 207 (summarizing binary relationship between content and non-content
stored data).
72
See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, at 222 (requiring the warrant to comply with the
traditional notions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); § 2703(d) (“A court order for
disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued . . . if the governmental entity offers
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Generally, warrants are subject to more geographic limitations than
subpoenas and court orders.73 In short, SCA subpoenas and court orders
are usually served via fax on the ISP, thereby creating a legal duty upon
the ISP to surrender the requested data to the government, eliminating the
need for an agent to ever step foot on the premises of the storage facility.74
The SCA, while generally applicable to all stored data, does not authorize
extraterritorial application of any of its mechanisms that compel
disclosure.75 However, a plain text reading of the statute does not readily
answer whether court orders issued under § 2703(d) are also subject to the
Federal Rules, and therefore, a review of relevant case law is in order.76
C. Warshak and Microsoft
Before the Internet connected the world, Fourth Amendment
questions primarily involved geographic considerations. 77
Cases
involving the required disclosure of email data authorized by
extraterritorial application of the SCA are remarkably scarce.78 In 2010,
specific and articulable facts showing that . . . the contents of a wire or electronic
communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”); see also
§ 2703(b)(1)(B)(i) (allowing the government to “require a provider of remote computing
service to disclose the contents of any wire or electronic communication . . . without required
notice to the subscriber or customer . . . or with prior notice from the governmental
entity . . . .“).
73
See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 210 (following the presumption against extraterritoriality
advanced in Morrison).
74
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 471 (declaring SCA orders function more
like subpoenas than traditional search warrants).
75
See generally § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure . . . of the
contents . . . in electronic storage . . . .”); In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 468 (finding
that § 2703 applies to the communications services Microsoft provides).
76
See § 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be
issued . . . if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that . . . the
contents of a wire or electronic communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.”); Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 214 (stating ordinary subpoenas may
require production of materials located abroad). Warrants and subpoenas are separate legal
instruments. Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 214. The warrant in Microsoft cited § 2703(a), not
§ 2703(d), making it a SCA warrant, not a court order or subpoena. Id. at 200.
77
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 476 (reviewing case law utilizing territorial
analyses); Andrew Tyler Ohlert, Appealing to Reason-able Expectations of Privacy: Increasing
Appellate Review under ECPA, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1731, 1746 (2015) (finding that generally very
few cases examine the SCA or ECPA). Many forms of modern surveillance are conducted in
secret and this threatens the legitimacy of judicial review. Ohlert, supra note 77, at 1746.
78
See State v. Rose, 330 P.3d 680, 688 (Or. App. 2014) (upholding a SCA court order to
compel the ISP to surrender the email data located in California). In Rose, Oregon law
enforcement officials sought to enforce a state-issued search warrant to seize email data
located in California in relation to a child pornography investigation. Id. at 682. While the
warrant was not issued under authority of the SCA, the court mentions the Act in relation to
whether a state court may issue an order similar to a § 2703(d) court order. Id. at 684. Because
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however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v.
Warshak, that the government violated the Fourth Amendment by
compelling an ISP to produce email data without first obtaining a
warrant.79 In Warshak, the government moved to present email data
seized under the SCA as evidence in relation to a fraud investigation. 80
Warshak moved to quash the motion because the government seized the
data without first satisfying the Fourth Amendment probable cause
requirement.81 The court likened an ISP to a post office or telephone
company, and thus, the government was otherwise forbidden from
unwarranted snooping on an individual. 82 Warshak held § 2703(d) was
unconstitutional because it allows disclosure of email data without
requiring probable cause.83 Generally, the standard of proof that the
government is required to show increases from reasonable suspicion to
probable cause based on a general balancing test between law and order

an Oregon statute created a mechanism for the process of interstate warrants similar to the
SCA, the court upheld the warrant and compelled the ISP to retrieve the data from California.
Id. at 686. In upholding the warrant, the court noted that the warrant under Oregon law was
sufficiently particular. Id. at 688. See also Mark Wilson, Comment, Castle in the Cloud:
Modernizing Constitutional Protections for Cloud-Stored Data on Mobile Devices, 43 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REV. 261, 277 (2013) (demonstrating that electronic storage is an uncertain term).
79
See 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding the Fourth Amendment applies to email
correspondence); see also Bowman, supra note 52, at 835 (arguing that the language of the
SCA coupled with loose judicial interpretation thereof lead to unconstitutional application
of the SCA).
80
See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 290–91 (describing the investigation and the compelled
disclosure by the email provider NuVox).
81
See id. at 283–84 (summarizing Warshak’s constitutional defense that email
communications are private).
82
See id. at 286 (discussing the similarities between an ISP and a post office or telephone
company and the constitutional protections thereof). While technically a third party, the
court distinguished an ISP from a bank in Miller because a bank is an intended recipient,
while an ISP is merely an intermediary. Id. at 288. See also Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum
Game: How to Increase the Productivity of the Fourth Amendment, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
549, 555 (2013) (utilizing a formula for privacy invasions similar to the Learned Hand
Balancing test involving negligence).
83
See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 290 (concluding that the SCA violates the Fourth Amendment,
but electing not to reverse the lower court’s conviction of Warshak due to harmless error).
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and the individual’s right to privacy.84 This expectation of privacy found
in Warshak, however, is only binding law within the Sixth Circuit.85
Microsoft catalyzed the debate of the government’s territorial reach of
stored data in criminal investigations and elevated the issue to the world
stage.86 In Microsoft, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) petitioned for and
received a warrant authorized by § 2703(a) to obtain email data linked to
an unnamed individual under the control of Microsoft in relation to an
ongoing narcotics investigation in December 2013.87 Microsoft moved to
quash the warrant, claiming that the authority of the SCA does not extend

84
See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that
granting SCA warrants to collect cell site location information (“CSLI”) based on the
reasonable and articulable facts standard is not per se unconstitutional under the third-party
doctrine); In re Application of U.S., 733 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (requiring a
showing of probable cause for a warrant to obtain CSLI); In re U.S. for Orders Authorizing
Installation and Use, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 396–97 (D. Md. 2006) (holding that probable cause
was required for pen register data because non-content data can amount to location tracking
similar to GPS). The government requested pen register data that may be used to determine
an individual’s past location using cellular tower triangulation. In re U.S. for Orders
Authorizing Installation and Use, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 392. The court then cryptically mused the
hybrid authority of the SCA warrant is “at best murky and, at worst, illusory.” Id. at 396.
See generally Daniel Solove, How Justice Scalia Defended Your Digital Privacy—and Also Held It
Back, VICE NEWS (Feb. 16, 2016), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/justice-scalia-digitalprivacy-and-the-third-party-doctrine [https://perma.cc/2QZK-Q4M3] [hereinafter Solove,
Justice Scalia] (positing as a constitutional originalist, Justice Scalia believed that GPS tracking
constituted a search, while disclosure of third-party data did not).
85
See Backer, supra note 18, at 392 (stating that Warshak appealed to the Sixth Circuit); see
also Bowman, supra note 52, at 820 (summarizing constitutional considerations for not
requiring probable cause to require disclosure of emails stored more than 180 days).
86
Stempel, supra note 17 (hailing the Microsoft appeal as a “landmark” victory for privacy
advocates).
87
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (identifying the type
of warrant in question as authorized by § 2703(a) of the SCA). The court likened this warrant
to a subpoena and found the government may compel disclosure of the data located in
Dublin. Id. at 472. But see Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled
and Maintained by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 230 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch,
concurring) (noting on appeal that the nationality of the suspect—under investigation and
tied to the relevant email account—was unknown). Further, those that are not U.S. citizens,
or U.S. citizens that claim they reside outside of the United States, stand to gain the most
from the majority ruling. Id. at 224. Since the government could never compel Microsoft to
disclose data located abroad, those individuals received an “absolute” protection. Id. See
also Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 781 (2016)
(discussing the interests of foreign governments if the tables were turned in a future
Microsoft scenario). Woods argues that U.S. ISPs should be allowed to disclose data stored
in the United States and linked to a non-U.S. citizen to a foreign government under specific
conditions. Id. But see Cox, supra note 1 (noting that many suspect the individual at the
center of the Microsoft dispute to be an operator of Silk Road, a black market available on
the dark web).
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beyond the United States’s territorial borders.88 The DOJ claimed that the
function of the SCA warrant did not involve extraterritorial searches or
seizures.89 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York upheld the warrant and ordered Microsoft to disclose the
enumerated email data in August of 2014.90 In July of 2016, the Second
Circuit overturned the decision upholding extraterritorial application of
the warrant.91
On appeal, Microsoft strictly followed the Morrison doctrine against
extraterritoriality and invalidated the warrant.92 In doing so, the court
determined the “Act’s privacy provisions were its impetus and focus” and
that the needs of law enforcement were not the “primary motivator for the
enactment.”93 Also, the court directed the government to adhere to the
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 470 (conveying Microsoft’s argument that
the presumption against extraterritoriality prohibits courts from applying the SCA outside
of U.S. borders).
89
See id. at 470 (concluding the debate centers around whether a search takes place with
SCA warrants).
90
See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., No. 13-MJ-2814, 2014 WL 4629624, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (upholding the SCA
warrant on appeal and providing minimal further analysis on the issues of probable cause
or extraterritoriality); Sam Thielman, Microsoft Case: DOJ Says It Can Demand Every Email
from Any U.S.-Based Provider, GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/sep/09/microsoft-court-case-hotmail-ireland-search-warrant
[https://perma.cc/RK3T-U6WN] [hereinafter Thielman, Microsoft Case] (acknowledging
that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) contends the emails in question resemble business
records subject to disclosure under the third-party doctrine).
91
See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that Congress
did not endorse extraterritorial application of SCA warrants); Stempel, supra note 17
(detailing the reversal of the SCA warrant in Microsoft). Before the appellate decision,
Microsoft warned that upholding the warrant could “spark a global ‘free-for-all’ that
would . . . [prompt] law enforcement authorities elsewhere [to] seize emails belonging to
Americans and stored in the United States.” Stempel, supra note 17. See also Lindsay La
Marca, Note, I Got 99 Problems and a Warrant Is One: How Current Interpretations of the Stored
Communications Act Offend International Comity, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 971, 995 (2016) (arguing
that courts should look to the physical location of the data in determining whether the
government may compel disclosure); Alexander Dugas Battey Jr., A Step in the Wrong
Direction: The Case for Restraining the Extraterritorial Application of the Stored Communications
Act, 42 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 262, 292–93 (2016) (suggesting the warrant
requirement found in the Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad (“LEADS”) Act to
be incorporated into the SCA).
92
See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, at 210 (following the two-pronged test in Morrison
wherein the court first decides “whether the relevant statutory provisions contemplate
extraterritorial application”). Second, if the court finds that the provision does not consider
extraterritorial application, the court then decides if the challenged conduct qualifies as
“extraterritorial.” Id. If the conduct is extraterritorial, it is outside the bounds of the statute.
Id.
93
See id. at 222 (concluding the focus of the SCA after reviewing its warrant provisions,
other sections of the statute, and accompanying legislative history).
88
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already-established mutual legal assistance treaty (“MLAT”) processes in
the interest of international comity.94 Finally, and perhaps most
remarkably, the Second Circuit acknowledged the intrusive third-party
doctrine and derived from the legislative history of the SCA that Congress
intended the Fourth Amendment to reign supreme. 95
Much of the debate on Microsoft centers on specific language within
the SCA.96 Before its appeal, Microsoft captured the attention of ISPs,
telecommunications companies, privacy advocates, and supporters of
international law.97 Compounded with the classified and controversial
information leaked by National Security Agency (“NSA”) analyst Edward
Snowden in 2013, scholars and journalists alike cite growing concern for

94
See id. at 221 (deferring to the international law enforcement framework of mutual legal
assistance treaty (“MLAT”) procedures); Daskal, supra note 9, at 395 (examining commonly
suggested jurisdictional Fourth Amendment triggers such as national origin or crime
alleged).
95
See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, at 214 (“When the government compels a private party
to assist it in conducting a search or seizure, the private party becomes an agent of the
government, and the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause applies in full force to the private
party’s actions.”); but see Joseph Schrempp, In Re Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account:
A Victory for Privacy in the Face of a New Technological World, 19 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
223, 235 (2016) (analyzing the privacy victory in Microsoft as a possible tool criminals could
use to evade law enforcement investigations in the future).
96
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (countering ambiguity
within the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) with the need to facilitate law enforcement activities).
Many email service providers do not verify the identity of an individual creating an account.
Id. at 474.
97
See Valsamis Mitsilegas, Surveillance and Digital Privacy in the Transatlantic ‘War on
Terror”: The Case for a Global Privacy Regime, 47 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. 1, 44 (2016)
(stating Microsoft offered to store Europeans’ data in Germany in November of 2015).
Microsoft designed this protocol to keep Europeans’ data out of the U.S. government’s reach
in the wake of the Southern District of New York’s opinion in Microsoft. Id. See also Steven
R. Swanson, Google Sets Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and International Law, 43 CONN. L. REV.
709, 712 (2011) (examining the rise of server farms within the context of Pirate Bay wishing
to avoid territorial laws); John Markoff, Microsoft Plumbs Ocean’s Depths to Test Underwater
Data Center, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/01/technology/
microsoft-plumbs-oceans-depths-to-test-underwater-data-center.html [https://perma.cc/
K2V8-4U5M] (reporting that Microsoft is testing an innovative underwater storage center off
the coast of California that uses oceanic current to power and cool blocks of storage
equipment); but see In re Search Warrant No. 16–960–M–01 to Google, No. 16-1061-M, 2017
WL 471564, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2017) (deviating from the holding in Microsoft and finding
that because the investigative conduct relevant to the SCA occurs within the United States,
no principles of extraterritoriality are implicated). The court also declined to follow Microsoft
in order to not “run afoul of principles of comity and also presents a commonsense
interpretation of the SCA which will not lead to absurd results.” Id. Elsevier, Inc. v.
Grossman, No. 12 CIV 5121 (KPF), 2016 WL 7077109, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2016) (following
the second prong of the two-prong test advanced in Morrison and utilized by Microsoft in
deciding whether the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”)
investigation at issue involved extraterritorial implications).
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data privacy and more generally, individual liberty.98 As a result,
individuals, civil rights groups, and the states themselves are watching
the federal government’s actions closely with respect to surveillance
practices involving domestic and international implications.99
98
See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers
Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsaphone-records-verizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/PP53-ASJU] (revealing widespread
and covert collection of cellular telephone data by the National Security Agency (“NSA”) on
behalf of the United States government); Dan Froomkin, Edward Snowden is on Twitter:
@Snowden, INTERCEPT (Sept. 29, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/09/29/edwardsnowden-twitter-snowden/ [https://perma.cc/98LG-QXQ6] [hereinafter Froomkin,
@Snowden] (announcing former NSA analyst Edward Snowden created a Twitter account to
more directly address nefarious surveillance practices by, among others, the U.S.
government); Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ [https://perma.cc/6HQX-ZX24] (publishing an
open letter available to the general public on February 16, 2016 in response to the
government’s request for Apple to create new code to unlock an iPhone used by one of the
San Bernardino shooters). The letter warns:
The implications of the government’s demands are chilling. If the
government can use the All Writs Act to make it easier to unlock your
iPhone, it would have the power to reach into anyone’s device to
capture their data. The government could extend this breach of privacy
and demand that Apple build surveillance software to intercept your
messages, access your health records or financial data, track your
location, or even access your phone’s microphone or camera without
your knowledge.
Cook, supra note 98. But see Katie Benner, U.S. Says It Has Unlocked iPhone without Apple, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/technology/apple-iphonefbi-justice-department-case.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/F8K6-TK7S] (alluding to other
ongoing cases involving the government seeking data stored on locked iPhones that suggest
the issue is likely to materialize again); Clark D. Cunningham, Apple and the American
Revolution: Remembering Why We Have the Fourth Amendment, 126 YALE L.J. F. 216, 225 (2016)
(detailing the amount of data requested by the government in Microsoft and connecting email
searches to phone searches).
99
See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B) (2012) [hereinafter PATRIOT
Act] (prescribing to obtain a warrant to seize foreign tangible things the government must
produce “a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized [foreign intelligence and international
terrorism] investigation . . . .”); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014) (stating that
the locking function on modern smartphones is a strong security feature). The Supreme
Court found that, incident to an arrest, the police may not search the contents of an
individual’s cell phone without first obtaining a warrant. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. See also
Elizabeth Atkins, Spying on Americans: At What Point Does the NSA’s Collection and Searching
of Metadata Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 51, 76–77 (2014)
(discussing the reduced standard of proof under the PATRIOT Act); Brett Weinstein, Legal
Responses and Countermeasures to National Security Letters, 47 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 217, 222
(2015) (discussing the negative public response to National Security Letters that function
similar to SCA warrants); Dan Froomkin, USA Freedom Act: Small Step for Post-Snowden
Reform, Giant Leap for Congress, INTERCEPT (June 2, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/06/
02/one-small-step-toward-post-snowden-surveillance-reform-one-giant-step-congress/
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D. New Legislation on the Block: the CalECPA
Recently, individual states, such as California, have addressed matters
regarding electronic communications privacy.100 The main goal of
California’s legislation is to ensure that law enforcement must obtain a
warrant based on probable cause before obtaining electronic
communication information or electronic device information. 101
California enacted the CalECPA in response to data privacy concerns
posed in Microsoft, and the bill contains both strengths and weaknesses.102

[https://perma.cc/G4HF-MPSG] (reporting the revision of the controversial PATRIOT Act
ends fourteen years of bulk collection of cell phone records while reauthorizing other
controversial provisions allowing the collection of business records). These amendments
accomplish “absolutely nothing to restrain the vast majority of the intrusive surveillance
revealed by Snowden.” Froomkin, supra note 99.
100
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 168/10 (2016) (requiring a court order based on probable
cause for law enforcement to obtain cell phone location information on an individual during
a criminal investigation); IND. CODE § 35-33-5-11(a) (2016) (prohibiting seizure of individual
user data for surveillance without a warrant); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE § 10-408(a)(1)(iv)
(2015) (requiring a court order based on probable cause for law enforcement to obtain
location information based on cell phones or other devices on an individual during a criminal
investigation); MINN. STAT. § 626A.42(2) (2015) (prohibiting the use of cell phone location
information in a criminal investigation without a warrant based on probable cause); MONT.
CODE § 46-5-110 (2015) (providing that a government entity must obtain a search warrant
before obtaining location information of an electronic device, and providing a civil penalty
for wrongful invasions); TENN. CODE § 39-13-610(c) (2016) (prohibiting a governmental entity
or law enforcement agency from obtaining the location information of an electronic device
without a search warrant except under certain circumstances); see also Randall T. Shepard,
The Maturing Nature of State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 424 (1996)
(discussing imbalances of rights between the state and federal levels); Sen. Mark Leno & Sen.
Joel Anderson, California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, (CalECPA)—SB 178, ACLU
OF N. CAL. (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.aclunc.org/our-work/legislation/calecpa
[https://perma.cc/V7CE-UENG] (introducing the CalECPA as revolutionary for
communications privacy in California).
101
See New CA Poll: Voters Concerned about Digital Privacy, Support Efforts to Increase
Protections from Warrantless Searches, ACLU OF N. CAL. (Sept. 2, 2015),
https://aclunc.org/news/new-ca-poll-voters-concerned-about-digital-privacy-supportefforts-increase-protections [https://perma.cc/KT69-GAUX] [hereinafter ACLU Poll]
(presenting polling data that indicates public desire for increased electronic communications
privacy, that companies like Google and Microsoft receive many government requests for
data each year, and scholarship raising concerns that granting such requests under the
outdated SCA threatens constitutional trends seen in SCA case law); Kim Zetter, California
Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital Privacy Law, WIRED (October 8, 2015),
https://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-best-digital-privacy-law/
[https://perma.cc/MW3V-D83H] (highlighting the potential that the CalECPA has to
bolster privacy expectations).
102
See infra Part III.C (examining the merits of CalECPA within the context of Microsoft).
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Numerous interest groups collaborated to make the CalECPA a
reality.103 Individuals expressed a desire for increased privacy rights. 104
Law enforcement officials wanted to provide essential emergency services
without violating the Constitution.105 Technology corporations did not
want to lose business when customers fled to encrypted or foreign
competitors.106 The language of the statute provides some guidance in the
wake of the Microsoft debate.107
The CalECPA contains numerous specific definitions that more
accurately reflect the current landscape of available methods of electronic
communications.108 Also, CalECPA section 1546.1(d)(2) requires law
enforcement to prove probable cause before obtaining electronic
communications information without assigning differing requisite
103
See Landmark, supra note 19 (interpreting the California legislature’s swift action as a
strong desire for data privacy assurances); ACLU Poll, supra note 101 (reporting AT&T
received over 64,000 government demands for customer data in 2014); see also Magid, supra
note 19 (referring to the interests of law enforcement officials as well as individual families
in protecting children from online abuse).
104
See ACLU Poll, supra note 101 (laying out results of a poll offered to the public regarding
data privacy). Before the CalECPA’s enactment, the ACLU conducted a statewide poll in
California that indicated a public desire for increased electronic privacy protections. Id.
First, eighty-two percent of Californians responded that the police should have a warrant
before searching digital information. Id. Second, seventy-nine percent supported a warrant
requirement for tracking cell phone activity. Id. Third, seventy-seven percent believed text
messages deserve the warrant requirement as well. Id.
105
See id. (mentioning law enforcement has incentive to adopt bright-line definitions
regarding data seizure); see also Colleen Curry, U.S. Cops Aren’t Getting Warrants to Spy on
People’s Cellphones for Petty Crimes, VICE NEWS (Aug. 25, 2015), https://news.vice.com/
article/us-cops-arent-getting-warrants-to-spy-on-peoples-cellphones-for-petty-crimes?utm
_source=vicenewsfb [https://perma.cc/6965-WASP] (finding that police use a device
known as a “stingray” that mimics a cell tower to intercept an individual’s data without his
knowledge). However, a stingray also collects other individuals’ cell phone data
indiscriminately. Curry, supra note 105. Further, there is question in numerous jurisdictions
as to whether the police are obtaining warrants before using stingrays. Id.
106
See Markoff, supra note 97 (introducing Microsoft’s plans to store customer data in stateof-the-art underwater data storage facilities off the coast of California to increase customer
privacy); ACLU Poll, supra note 101 (noting citizens’ interest in privacy regarding their text
messages and cell phones).
107
See supra Part II.D (reviewing language in the CalECPA that assists in resolving the
extraterritoriality and standard of proof concerns exhibited in Microsoft).
108
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546(c) (2016) (defining electronic communication as: “the
transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system”);
§ 1546(d) (defining electronic communication information as: “any information about an
electronic communication . . . including[] . . . the contents, sender, recipients, format, or
location of the sender or recipients at any point during the communication . . .”); § 1546(e)
(defining electronic communication service as: “a service that provides to its subscribers or
users the ability to send or receive electronic communications, including any service that acts
as an intermediary in the transmission of electronic communications, or stores electronic
communication information”).
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standards of proof based on the 180-day distinction seen in the SCA.109
Instead, all warrants seeking electronic communication data require
probable cause consistent with the Fourth Amendment, regardless of time
in storage.110 This measure eliminates concerns over the time limit
imposed in the SCA that scholars claim is arbitrary.111 Further the
CalECPA generally prohibits required disclosure, subject to limited
exceptions and also generally requires notice.112 However, § 1546.1(d)(3)
more generally limits the territorial reach of the CalECPA in a manner
similar to § 2703(a) of the SCA.113
109
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
provider of electronic communications services of the contents of a wire or electronic
communication that has been in electronic storage in an electronic communications system
for more than one hundred and eighty days by the means available under subsection (b) of
this section.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(1) (2016) (“Except as provided in this section, a
government entity shall not do any of the following: [c]ompel the production of or access to
electronic communication information from a service provider.”); § 1546.1(d)(2) (“A court
shall issue such an order upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the
information is relevant to an active investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by
state or federal law.”).
110
Compare U.S. Const. amend. IV (mandating that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”), with § 1546.1(d)(1) (“The warrant shall
describe with particularity the information to be seized by specifying the time periods
covered and, as appropriate and reasonable, the target individuals or accounts, the
applications or services covered, and the types of information sought.”); see also Kerr, User’s
Guide supra note 10, at 1234 (advancing further privacy protections to RCS and ECS data in
storage for more than 180 days).
111
See Backer, supra note 18, at 396 (suggesting that all email is subject to the reasonable
expectation of privacy in Katz); Hinz, supra note 47, at 521 (summarizing a recent proposal
by Senator Patrick Leahy to eliminate the 180-day distinction within the SCA and require a
warrant for compelled disclosure of any ECS content no matter the time in storage).
112
See § 1546.1(c)(5) (“[i]f the government entity, in good faith, believes that an emergency
involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires access to the
electronic device information . . . .”); § 1546.1(c)(6) (“[i]f the government entity, in good faith,
believes the device to be lost, stolen, or abandoned, provided that the entity shall only access
electronic device information in order to attempt to identify, verify, or contact the owner or
authorized possessor of the device . . . .”); § 1546.2(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this
section, any government entity that executes a warrant[] . . . shall serve upon[] . . . the
identified targets of the warrant or emergency access, a notice that informs the recipient that
information about the recipient has been compelled or obtained . . . .”).
113
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require the
disclosure . . . only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . .”), with § 1546.1(d)(3) (“The warrant shall comply
with all other provisions of California and federal law, including any provisions prohibiting,
limiting, or imposing additional requirements on the use of search warrants.”); see also CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1546.1(b)(4) (2016) (providing the government may compel production of or
access to electronic information from an ISP “[p]ursuant to a subpoena issued pursuant to
existing state law, provided that the information is not sought for the purpose of
investigating or prosecuting a criminal offense, and compelling the production of or access
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One alternative to adopting the language of the CalECPA in resolving
concerns over Microsoft that is important to consider is a recent
amendment to Rule 41 of the F.R.C.P.114 Rule 41(b)(6)(a) allows a district
judge to authorize remote access of electronic storage media located
within or outside that district in situations where technological means
have been used to conceal the location of the storage media.115 Criticism
of the SCA, individual state data privacy legislation, and an amendment
to the F.R.C.P. indicate a problem exists with data privacy.116
III. ANALYSIS
Recent discussion following Microsoft leaves a key issue regarding
data privacy unresolved.117 The reversing opinion only addressed the
territorial reach of “warrants” authorized by SCA § 2703(a) but not other
available court orders described in § 2703(d).118 This distinction is
to the information via the subpoena is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law”); see
also Bryan R. Kelly, #privacyprotection: How the United States Can Get Its Head out of the Sand
and into the Clouds to Secure Fourth Amendment Protections for Cloud Journalists, 55 Washburn
L.J. 669, 697 (2016) (suggesting Congress model its updated SCA after the newly-enacted
CalECPA).
114
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (2016) (allowing extraterritorial disclosure of data by ISPs
to the government). The amendment adds:
[A] magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities
related to a crime may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant to
use remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy
electronically stored information located within or outside that district
if: (a) the district where the media or information is located has been
concealed through technological means; or (b) in an investigation of a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5), the media are protected computers
that have been damaged without authorization and are located in five
or more districts.
Id. See also Zach Lerner, A Warrant to Hack: An Analysis of the Proposed Amendments to Rule 41
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH. 26, 30 (2016) (advancing the
goal of amending Rule 41 is to remove unnecessary obstacles to effective law enforcement
investigations involving digital crimes). However, critics of Proposed Rule 41 believe
amending this rule would remove transparency from the government’s investigation. Id. at
43.
115
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (“A magistrate judge with authority in any district where
activities related to a crime may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant to use remote
access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically stored
information located within or outside that district . . . .”).
116
See infra Part III.A (exploring dissonance between the Fourth Amendment in terms of
SCA disclosure).
117
See Green, supra note 45, at 187–88 (summarizing the parties’ positions in the lower
court opinion in Microsoft).
118
See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 220 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding Congress
intended the SCA warrant to entail domestic limitations when enacting the SCA); Shickich,
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important because warrants authorized by § 2703(a) require the
government to prove probable cause and are subject to the geographic
limitations of the F.R.C.P., whereas court orders prescribed in § 2703(d)
are available through the specific and articulable facts standard, and not
constrained by the physical boundaries of the F.R.C.P.119 While warrants
seeking email data less than 180 days old are now deservedly limited
geographically, non-content data should be considered in the analysis as
well.120 Individual states, like California, are enacting legislation to
remedy these concerns, but state-based legislation does not address
communications privacy on a federal level.121
First, Part III.A examines the SCA under emerging paradigms of the
Fourth Amendment.122 Next, Part III.B analyzes current interests omitted
from the Microsoft decision.123 Part III.C then assesses the CalECPA and
its detailed language as a possible solution to those interests impinged on
by Microsoft.124 Finally, Part III.D offers a solution to both the standard of
proof and extraterritorial application dilemmas following Microsoft by
proposing an amendment to § 2703(d).125
A. Revisiting the SCA and the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Data
Email data, data stored in the cloud, social media records, and
information transmitted from wearable health technology is subject to

supra note 48, at 462 (observing that § 2703 governs compelled disclosure of content and noncontent data).
119
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require the
disclosure . . . only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . .”), with § 2703(d) (“A court order . . . may be issued
by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental
entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that . . . the contents . . . are relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”); see also In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp.
3d 466, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (admitting that § 2703(a) ambiguously refers to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”). Two interpretations are possible: first, § 2703(a) could
be interpreted to incorporate the geographic limitations included in F.R.C.P. 41; and second,
Congress intended some procedural aspects of § 2703(a) to apply to investigations, while
other “more substantive rules are derived from other sources.” In re Warrant to Search, 15 F.
Supp. 3d at 470.
120
See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 222 (holding Congress did not intend for SCA warrants
to apply extraterritorially).
121
See infra Part III.C (concluding that protections created by the CalECPA do not override
the SCA in federal investigations).
122
See infra Part III.A (exploring current problems with SCA disclosure regarding the
Fourth Amendment).
123
See infra Part III.B (discussing the unresolved questions left from Microsoft).
124
See infra Part III.C (examining the CalECPA’s strengths and weaknesses).
125
See infra Part III.D (proposing amendment to § 2703(d)).
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required disclosure according to a statute contemplated in the 1980s.126
The standard of proof of anything, “relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation” is a lower threshold for the government to meet
when seeking older, stored email content compared with probable cause,
which is the standard when seeking access to correspondence sent
through the ordinary mail.127 Ambiguity within the text of the Act further
compounds privacy concerns.128 While individuals enjoy more defined
privacy expectations regarding their email content following Microsoft,
older emails and non-content data remain there for the taking.129
If the requirement of probable cause is ambiguous within the text of
the statute, further difficulties manifest when courts are forced to
arbitrarily assign standards of proof to the limited technological
distinctions within the SCA.130 Section 2703 especially lumps all Internet
activity into two categories, ECS and RCS.131 With § 2703(a), the
126
See Daskal, supra note 9, at 366 (stating that records of FaceTime and Google Chats, as
well as non-content information like recipient logs, are subject to the provisions of the SCA);
Langley, supra note 9, at 1644 (summarizing how products, such as Fitbit, monitor and store
data related to the user’s respiratory rate, skin temperature, and heart rate); see also
Schultheis, supra note 9, at 683 (suggesting that data stored in the cloud is at increased risk
following interpretations of the SCA as seen in Microsoft).
127
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) (“A court order . . . may be issued by any court that is a
court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific
and articulable facts showing that . . . the contents . . . are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.”); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th
Cir. 2010) (finding that email subscribers enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
their email content).
128
See § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure . . . only pursuant to
a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure . . . .”); see also In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(admitting that the text of the SCA is ambiguous as to whether the ordinary physical
boundaries of the F.R.C.P. apply to the warrant provision in § 2703(a)); Backer, supra note 18,
at 380 (lamenting ambiguity within the SCA led the government to seek vast amounts of user
data without proving probable cause).
129
Compare Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (prescribing Fourth Amendment protections to email
correspondence despite the lower standard of proof in the SCA), with Matter of Warrant to
Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp. v. United
States, 829 F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding Congress did not intend for the SCA to apply
extraterritorially for warrants but not subpoenas or court orders on appeal); see also Backer,
supra note 18, at 398 (expressing desire that the Supreme Court afford Fourth Amendment
protections to email correspondence).
130
See Compare United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (App. Armed Forces 1996)
(finding an individual receives Fourth Amendment protection of remotely stored AOL
emails), with Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (applying Fourth Amendment protections to email
correspondence despite the reduced standard of proof in the SCA); see also Green, supra note
45, at 190 (advancing cloud technology as an example of a confusing concept to regulate with
current legislation).
131
See Hinz, supra note 47, at 515 (illustrating how the framework of the SCA fails to
consider online activity that fits both ECS and RCS categories).
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government may obtain “contents of a wire or electronic communication,”
which applies to virtually all of the services offered online.132
Nevertheless, because the SCA contains limited definitions of different
kinds of ISPs, many services today do not easily fit within the ECS or RCS
classification.133 This framework shifts the burden onto courts to
determine what privacy considerations a unique Internet service
deserves.134 The credibility of the process by which courts determine the
proper standard of proof erodes if the governing statute lacks sufficient
definitions of the services affected.135 Microsoft was an example of this
attrition.136
Ultimately, Microsoft laid to rest much of the confusion observed when
the term “warrant” found in § 2703(a) is conflated with a court order or
subpoena available in § 2703(d), specifically regarding their geographic
limitations.137 However, this decision only addressed the privacy
protection afforded to one common form of electronic activity and heaved
a glut of other common forms into the shadows.138 As a result, the
geographic reach of court orders authorized by § 2703(d) remains
unfettered.139

See § 2703(a) (defining the broad scope of the government’s authority).
See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (expressing
concern over the difficulty in applying the SCA to the various forms of communications
technologies).
134
See id. (identifying that CSLI falls within § 2703(d) and that the reduced standard of
proof is not per se unconstitutional). However, the court heavily analyzed what standard of
proof should be applied pursuant to the SCA. Id. at 610. See also In re U.S. for Orders
Authorizing Installation and Use, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 (D. Md. 2006) (noting the statute’s
lack of clear definitions regarding the disclosure of CSLI).
135
See Baker, supra note 47, at 110 (stating courts have difficulty in applying the SCA, which
led to a quizzical body of jurisprudence).
136
See supra Part II.C (analyzing the rationale and privacy implications of Microsoft in the
Southern District Court of New York). In effect, Microsoft removed the probable cause
requirement set forth in Warshak. Supra Part II.C.
137
See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016) (determining that
Congress unequivocally intended for geographic limitations enumerated in F.R.C.P. 41 to
apply to SCA warrants); Green, supra note 45, at 192 (predicting all ECPA warrants in the
future may functionally resemble subpoenas).
138
See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 220–22 (analyzing the issue of geographic limitations
only within the context of § 2703(a) warrants).
139
See id. at 216 (reinforcing the concept that subpoenas may be applied extraterritorially
by stating foreign entities are not absolutely insulated from U.S. grand jury subpoenas solely
because of their geographic location).
132
133
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B. The Microsoft Reversal Only Partially Addresses Data Privacy
Two issues loom in the aftermath of Microsoft.140 First, the SCA does
not require probable cause to compel an ISP to disclose email content data
that is in RCS storage for more than 180 days.141 Second, though the
Second Circuit applied the geographic bounds found in the F.R.C.P. to
§ 2703(a), the court failed to address whether these same limits apply to
other court orders authorized in § 2703(d).142 Assuming the same facts in
Microsoft except replacing the email content data the government sought
with non-content data, similar international considerations would be
triggered if a U.S. agency infringed on the sovereign authority of another
nation by obtaining that data.143
In Microsoft, the lower court relied heavily on the language of
§ 2703(d) where a SCA warrant functions more like a subpoena, rather
than a search warrant, and required a lower standard of proof.144 Neither
Warshak nor Microsoft directly addressed the sufficiency of the 180-day
limitation as a determinative factor when conducting Fourth Amendment
analyses.145 Further, scholars suggest the 180-day distinction no longer
advances the original purport of the SCA.146
Broad application of the third-party doctrine to vastly distinct forms
of personal data threatens the Fourth Amendment rights of United States

140
See infra Part III.B (summarizing the standard of proof and extraterritoriality issues
following Microsoft).
141
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (authorizing compelled disclosure “of the contents of a
wire or electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an electronic
communications system for more than one hundred and eighty days” using a court order in
§ 2703(d)); § 2703(d) (“[a] court order . . . may be issued by any court that is a court of
competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and
articulable facts showing that . . . the contents . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.”).
142
See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 208 (applying the F.R.C.P. only to SCA § 2703(a)).
143
See id. at 221 (deliberating upon previously established law enforcement procedures
between the United States and Ireland by way of the MLAT).
144
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 468–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (discussing
various standards of proof available under § 2703); Hinz, supra note 47, at 521 (summarizing
a recent suggestion by Senator Patrick Leahy to eliminate the 180-day distinction within the
SCA and require a warrant for all data).
145
See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that
email correspondence today may contain information concerning an individual’s private
life); In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 477 (rejecting Fourth Amendment protections
for email communications on the basis of the third-party doctrine).
146
See Backer, supra note 18, at 399 (arguing the SCA is outdated and the privacy
considerations of numerous Americans are at risk); Daskal, supra note 9, at 378–79
(concluding geographic location no longer limits investigations involving data); Hinz supra
note 47, at 518 (summarizing unsuccessful proposed legislation to remove the 180-day time
limitation found within the SCA).
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citizens.147 In Katz, the Court stated that communications conducted in
public do not automatically lose Fourth Amendment protections. 148 Email
correspondence today regularly occurs both publicly and privately, and
users still consider data relating to their messages private.149 Yet, without
further statutory protection in the SCA, individuals will continue to
submit private information to third-party services like Twitter under the
misconception that their data is somehow protected.150 Though the
Second Circuit availed priority stored communications data sought by
SCA warrants with Fourth Amendment considerations, non-priority
stored communications sought with SCA court orders and subpoenas
remains unprotected.151
Email data today is sharply distinguishable from both the banking
records that spawned the third-party doctrine and email data common in
1986 when Congress enacted the SCA.152 Banking records reveal strictly

See Cover, supra note 48, at 1473 (positing many corporations act as avatars for their
users and individuals have a privacy expectation despite the existence of the third-party
doctrine).
148
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (providing
that individuals may express a subjective desire to keep certain communications or materials
private, even while in public areas); see also Baker, supra note 47, at 459 (applying the concept
of the term public to easily accessible social media accounts like Twitter or Facebook); but see
In re Search Warrant No. 16–960–M–01 to Google, No. 16-960-M, 2017 WL 471564, at *11 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 3, 2017) (holding that processing SCA warrants to obtain potentially foreign-stored
data controlled by Google does not involve extraterritorial government conduct). The Court
emphasized “[e]lectronically transferring data from a server in a foreign country to Google’s
data center in California does not amount to a ‘seizure’ because there is no meaningful
interference with the account holder’s possessory interest in the user data.” In re Search
Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 2017 WL 471564, at *9. See also Elsevier, Inc. v. Grossman,
No. 12 CIV 5121 (KPF), 2016 WL 7077109, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2016) (analyzing the possible
extraterritorial implications of a RICO investigation after Microsoft).
149
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (finding that data poses no immediate
threat to an arresting officer, and thus, its seizure must only be accessed pursuant to a search
warrant); Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1585–86 (analyzing an individual’s subjective
expectation of privacy with respect to the Fourth Amendment).
150
See Cover, supra note 48, at 1450 (positing the voluntary nature of Internet
communications threaten to diminish privacy expectations pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment); see also Froomkin, @Snowden, supra note 98 (predicting Twitter will face
pressure from the U.S. government to disclose data concerning tweets made by Edward
Snowden from @Snowden).
151
See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 214 (2d Cir. 2016) (“When the government
compels a private party to assist it in conducting a search or seizure, the private party
becomes an agent of the government, and the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause applies
in full force to the private party’s actions.”). Here, the court discussed only warrants and not
subpoenas or court orders. Id.
152
See Hinz supra note 47, at 492–93 (noting hospitals faced high costs to store medical
records and some chose to send records electronically to third-party storage services);
147
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financial information, while email content today may contain anything
from an Amazon receipt to sensitive health information. 153 In the past,
businesses primarily used email for internal communication on private
servers, distinct from other email servers used by other businesses. 154
Today, businesses, organizations, and individuals alike all utilize publicly
available email and other services for convenient communication on a
daily basis.155 A conglomeration of all of the data an individual transmits
renders a unique account of his or her life.156 Courts reviewing the SCA
have yet to fully recognize this distinction. 157
SCA orders and subpoenas, available under the significantly reduced
specific and articulable facts standard, establish an exception to the Fourth
Amendment.158 Courts recognize this exception without considering the
concept of intrusion discussed in Katz.159 By requiring the ISP to surrender
information related to an ongoing criminal investigation, the government

Kastenmeier, supra note 54, at 734 (stating cell phone tracking is more difficult than that of
traditional mobile phones).
153
See Cover, supra note 48, at 1449 (describing the ways technology companies today
gather and utilize user data). Amazon recommends books based on an individual’s
shopping history. Id. Readers of the online Washington Post receive ads tailored from their
Amazon history as well. Id. Online shopping history can reveal intimate personal
information, for example that an individual is pregnant. Id. See also Langley, supra note 9, at
1642 (advancing that Fitbits monitor, among other things, respiration, heart rate, and
hydration level). These devices transmit information everywhere they go but surprisingly
are not regulated by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) or
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). Id. at 1648.
154
See Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1559–60 (describing the limited nature of early business
Internet usage).
155
See Robison, supra note 53, at 1202 (examining cloud technology and its role in reducing
a user’s physical location as a barrier to accessing and manipulating data).
156
See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010) (musing that the term
“account” truly conveys the illustrative nature of the sum of a user’s data).
157
See Greenwald, supra note 98 (summarizing widespread domestic and international
concern following the disclosure of NSA collection of mass cell phone records by Edward
Snowden); cf. Cook, supra note 98 (rebuking the government’s request for Apple to create
code capable of bypassing older iPhone encryption technology on the grounds that this
would lead to future requests for code capable of bypassing new iPhone technology, thus
compromising the privacy considerations of millions of individuals worldwide). Privacy
legislation, such as the SCA, may become totally obsolete if the government may access
content on mobile devices without the aid of the manufacturer. Cook, supra note 98.
158
See Shickich, supra note 48, at 463–64 (explaining SCA orders do not require probable
cause but allow the government to compel disclosure of non-content data by ISPs).
159
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“There is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”); In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (allowing
compelled disclosure of email non-content data based on a showing of specific and
articulable facts rather than probable cause).
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avoids having to conduct an intrusive search. 160 Instead, the ISP obtains
the data and delivers it to the government. 161 However, an intrusion still
occurs regardless of who obtains the data.162 The hybrid function of the
§ 2703(d) court order is to blame for this form of intrusion, and the
evidence obtained on this basis threatens basic constitutional rights of
millions of Internet users.163
Widespread use of the SCA to obtain stored communications data
without corresponding Fourth Amendment scruples enables the
government to obtain a detailed portrait of an individual’s private life. 164
When aggregated, electronic communications data form a mosaic of an
individual’s life and allows the government to look in with much more
detail than an ordinary wiretap or pen-register.165 The government is able
to take this data, and through computing technology, paint very accurate
portraits of individuals under investigation. 166 Allowing this type of
information gathering on such a low standard of proof threatens the
Fourth Amendment protections of liberty itself.167 Congress must
recognize this chasm, act swiftly to correct the outdated SCA, and

160
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 471–72 (accepting the government’s
contention that the SCA warrant functions more like a subpoena and does not involve a
search).
161
See Klamann, supra note 69, at 1421 (stating the task of obtaining the data is assigned to
the ISP, not the government).
162
See Search, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 672 (defining a search as: “[a]n
examination of a person’s body, property, or other area that the person would reasonably be
expected to consider as private, conducted by a law enforcement officer for the purpose of
finding evidence of a crime”); Seizure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 678
(elucidating seizure as: “[t]he act or instance of taking possession of a person or property by
legal right or process; esp. . . . a confiscation or arrest that may interfere with a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy”); Morrison, supra note 9, at 267 (offering that the Federal
Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) may ask ISPs to search for illegal content on websites).
163
See Backer, supra note 18, at 398 (underlining the need for updated legislation to avoid
privacy violations when the government obtains mass amounts of communications data
linked to an individual without a warrant); Foley, supra note 33, 468 (addressing the issue of
whether or not casual online searches should be afforded constitutional privacy protections
based on originalist interpretation).
164
See Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1596 (finding the SCA poses constitutional questions to
data in remote storage); see also Atkins, supra note 99, at 75 (summarizing recent privacy
concerns following reporting that the United States conducts broad dragnet-style
surveillance over its citizens without their knowledge under the PATRIOT Act).
165
See Walsh, Mosaic, supra note 47, at 223 (positing that because an individual’s
movements can be tracked with current technology, there should be some limit to the
government’s ability to do so).
166
See id. at 173 (summarizing recognition of mosaic theory by the Supreme Court).
167
See id. at 239 (explaining non-content data such as CSLI and email account log
information can be used to track an individual’s physical movements).
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rebalance the liberty interests of individuals with the needs of law
enforcement.168
In general, courts may not construe extraterritorial application within
an act absent express language or clear legislative intent thereof.169
However, the lower court in Microsoft interpreted one passage of
legislative history expressly prohibiting extraterritorial application as an
express endorsement.170 The House Report reflects the SCA applies only
to data transactions taking place within the territorial United States.171
Further, when Congress enacted the SCA, extraterritorial searches would
have been inconceivable because most email activity at the time occurred
domestically within private servers, primarily for business purposes. 172
Thus, the rationale utilized by the Southern District of New York in
applying SCA warrants extraterritorially lacked congressional approval
and violated the presumption against territoriality.173
The legislative history surrounding the 1986 Act indicates Congress
did not intend for any provision involving compelled disclosure in the
168
See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 233 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring)
(commending Congress on previously adept privacy legislation and urging legislators to
“take the occasion to address thoughtfully and dispassionately the suitability of many of the
statute’s provisions to serving contemporary needs[]” and amend the SCA); see also Marca,
supra note 91, at 995 (positing the location of the data as a key point in the government
disclosure analysis); Battey Jr., supra note 91, at 292–93 (suggesting Congress look to the
already relevant LEADS Act for guidance in adding a warrant requirement to the outdated
SCA).
169
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 249 (2010) (prohibiting
extraterritorial application of statutes lacking either express language or Congressional
assent thereof); but see Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 443 (1932) (holding the
government may, in relation to a criminal trial, compel the return of a U.S. citizen that
maintained minimum contacts with the United States); see also Schultheis, supra note 9, at 675
(stating the text of the SCA does not reference extraterritorial application).
170
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (upholding the SCA
warrant to compel Microsoft to produce data located in Ireland); Morrison, 561 U.S. at 249
(mandating when neither a federal statute nor its legislative history indicates intent for
extraterritorial application, it has none).
171
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 473 (acknowledging the House Report while
accepting the government’s position that in the instant case, the function of the SCA warrant
does not involve extraterritorial principles); H.R. Rep. 99-647, at 32–33 (1986) (indicating “the
controls in [§ 2703] regarding access to stored wire and electronic communications are
intended to apply only to access within the territorial United States”) (emphasis added).
172
See Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1563 (stating in the 1980s, even if businesses stored
communications remotely, those servers were domestic).
173
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 477 (allowing the DOJ to compel Microsoft
to return data stored in Ireland); Schultheis, supra note 9, at 680 (summarizing Ireland’s
concern over the United States unilaterally seizing emails stored within its borders); but see
Kerr, Third-Party, supra note 34, at 566 (defending application of the third-party doctrine in
that it focuses on data neutrality rather than the individual’s origin in a more orderly
fashion).
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SCA to apply extraterritorially.174 However, the lower court in Microsoft
ignored the House Report in favor of case law supporting the position that
since it is the ISP that obtains the data, no principles of extraterritoriality
are affected.175 There, Microsoft acknowledged the presumption against
extraterritoriality found in Morrison, yet chose to distinguish that case
from the current situation based on the hybrid function of the SCA
warrant.176 In fact, the magistrate judge conceded that the language of
§ 2703(a) ambiguously references the requirements of the F.R.C.P. without
addressing the issue of extraterritoriality.177 Distinguishable from
Blackmer, the warrant in Microsoft was aimed at a third-party ISP, not an
individual.178 Many larger ISPs operate globally and maintain some form
of minimum contacts with the United States. 179 Because many of these
ISPs retain non-content data domestically, the government could easily
obtain non-priority stored communications by securing the § 2703(d)
order in the district within which the company stores the data. 180
Currently, § 2703(d) orders do not require probable cause and can be used
to obtain a wide variety of non-priority data.181 Then, the government can
analyze that data and utilize it to particularize future orders, subpoenas,
or warrants.182 Thus, § 2703(d) remains a trap door for government
174
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 478 (holding the SCA may be applied to
obtain data stored outside U.S. borders); see also H.R. Rep. 99-647, at 32–33 (1986)
(determining the term “interstate or foreign commerce” excludes interceptions that occur
outside of the United States).
175
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 479 (concluding the government’s reach
established in Blackmer was sufficient to override the House Report’s express prohibition on
extraterritorial application).
176
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (authorizing compelled disclosure of stored
communications data); In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 471–72 (dismissing the issue
of extraterritorial application in favor of the framework of the SCA).
177
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 470 (admitting that the language of the
statute is ambiguous regarding the physical limitations of the F.R.C.P.). The F.R.C.P., if
applicable to § 2703(d), require subpoenas and court orders to be executed domestically. Id.
178
See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 433 (1932) (stating Blackmer chose to travel
to France and remained there even after being served a subpoena under a long-arm statute);
In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 476 (noting Microsoft is a third-party ISP subject to
required disclosure in § 2703).
179
See Cover, supra note 48, at 1478 (highlighting the global nature of U.S.-based companies
like Apple and Google); Markoff, supra note 97 (advancing Microsoft is testing innovative
underwater storage centers outside U.S. jurisdiction). Microsoft’s reported aim is to explore
and implement environmentally friendly storage methods. Markoff, supra note 97.
180
See Cover, supra note 48, at 1460 (describing how non-content data may be disclosed
without a warrant); Shickich, supra note 48, at 469 (finding that non-content data enjoys little
Fourth Amendment protection under the SCA).
181
See Shickich, supra note 48, at 462–63 (enumerating customer name, address, records of
session durations, and length and type of service used as examples of non-content data).
182
See Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1583 (stating that personal data reveals much more about
an individual than ordinary business records such as physical location).
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investigations.183 Likely a result, courts in the future will have little
guidance as to the privacy expectations and procedures of non-priority
stored communications.184
Individuals and ISPs alike have an interest in a definitive statutory
resolution regarding privacy expectations of non-priority data and
extraterritorial application of the SCA.185 With the privacy protections of
§ 2703(d) left unresolved, domestic and foreign entities that do business
with United States citizens are still subject to similar orders in
surrendering evidence in the company’s custody, possession, or control. 186
By compelling corporations to procure the materials themselves, courts
may avoid extraterritoriality concerns, but they do not avoid possible
international implications.187 The same standard to obtain bank records
now seemingly applies to non-priority data in the wake of Microsoft.188 As
a result, domestic ISPs stand to lose substantial future business due to
privacy concerns of their customers.189 Additionally, by seizing nonpriority stored communications located abroad through SCA warrants,
the United States government stands to lose credibility within the
international community.190 Discord between existing doctrines and the
Microsoft decision leaves future courts at peril in granting SCA warrants
seeking data stored outside of the United States, and some states are

See Shickich, supra note 48, at 462–63 (conveying that non-content records may be
disclosed under the reduced standard of proof found in § 2703(d)).
184
See id. at 464 (establishing the general trend that courts view non-content data as less
deserving of privacy protection than content data).
185
See Baker, supra note 47, at 110–11 (arguing for the heavy reform or outright repeal of
the SCA due to evidence of inadequacy in application across a wide range of courts);
Mitsilegas, supra note 97, at 44 (outlining one response taken by Microsoft to keep Europeans’
data safe from U.S.-based intelligence efforts).
186
See Green, supra note 45, at 199 (stating Apple, Google, and Facebook have begun
encrypting their users’ data); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 249 (2010)
(endorsing the presumption against extraterritoriality when a statute contains only domestic
considerations).
187
See Green, supra note 45, at 199 (suggesting that a notice requirement may prove helpful
in resolving international complications); Schultheis, supra note 9, at 682 (stating nations are
to work together in investigating and prosecuting crime); see also Walsh, Extraterritoriality,
supra note 40, at 640 (arguing that the government has an interest in pursuing SEC violations
abroad but must also follow the Constitution and the presumption against extraterritoriality
in its pursuits).
188
See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2016) (analyzing
extraterritorial application of the SCA only within the context of § 2703(a)).
189
See Swanson, supra note 97, at 712 (noting Google filed for a patent for a water-based
data center in 2007); but see Schultheis, supra note 9, at 669 (stating the lower court in Microsoft
ignored geographic boundaries altogether by focusing on the function of the SCA warrant).
190
See Schultheis, supra note 9, at 683 (discussing possible negative international responses
to the use of SCA warrants like in Microsoft).
183
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experimenting with their own privacy legislation to avoid state-level
instances of the federal Microsoft scenario.191
C. CalECPA Resolves Microsoft’s Deficiencies
Congress met growing concern for government accountability and
individual privacy following the Snowden leaks with little legislative
action.192 Further uncertainty involving the standard of proof and
extraterritoriality limitations that normally accompany search warrants
could compound international tensions.193 This Part discusses the
CalECPA with regard to its potential to solve the questionable standard
of proof and extraterritorial application of the SCA evident in Microsoft.194
While other states approached the issue of digital privacy with a
probable cause requirement, the CalECPA is the most comprehensive bill
of its kind.195 By eliminating the 180-day distinction found in the SCA, the
CalECPA requires each warrant to be granted upon a showing of probable
cause.196
This heightened standard of proof may resolve the

191
See infra Part III.C (examining the strengths and weaknesses of the CalECPA compared
to the SCA); Berman, supra note 44, at 321 (describing numerous concerns following the
Southern District of New York’s ratification of the warrant in Microsoft).
192
See Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10, at 1233–34 (analyzing rationales for raising the
standard of proof required to obtain user data). Kerr suggests raising privacy protections
for content stored for more than 180 days. Id. at 1234. See also Froomkin, @Snowden, supra
note 99 (describing the amendment to the PATRIOT Act as a minimal win for privacy
advocates).
193
See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 221 (acknowledging delicate international considerations
in denying extraterritorial application of the warrant authorized by § 2703(a)); Daskal, supra
note 9, at 378 (arguing SCA warrants should be subject to the same territorial limitations as
ordinary search warrants governed by the F.R.C.P.).
194
See infra Part III.C (analyzing the potential of the CalECPA to resolve lingering privacy
concerns following Microsoft).
195
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 168/10 (2016) (requiring a court order based on probable cause
to obtain CSLI); IND. CODE § 35-33-5-9 (2016) (prohibiting disclosure of data and use of
unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance without proving probable cause); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE § 10-408 (2015) (requiring a court order based on probable cause for law
enforcement to obtain location information based on cell phones or other devices on an
individual during a criminal investigation); MINN. STAT. § 626A.42 (2016) (prohibiting the
use of cell phone location information in a criminal investigation without a warrant based
on probable cause); MONT. CODE § 46-5-110 (2015) (mandating a government entity must
obtain a search warrant before obtaining location information of an electronic device); TENN.
CODE § 39-13-610 (2016) (forbidding a governmental entity or law enforcement agency from
obtaining the location information of an electronic device without a search warrant).
196
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure
by a provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one
hundred and eighty days or less . . . .”), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (2016) (“A court
shall issue such an order upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the
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inconsistencies seen in previous cases analyzing the SCA.197 Further,
Warshak established Fourth Amendment protections for email
communications.198 While Warshak is controlling law only within the Sixth
Circuit, the CalECPA bolsters privacy expectations of email
communications by requiring probable cause for all warrants seeking
disclosure of electronic communications information from an ISP on a
state level.199 The required standard of proof became an issue in Microsoft
because there, extraterritorial application of the warrant only involved
email data in storage for less than 180 days.200 The CalECPA contains no
such time distinction and probable cause is required for the government
to obtain electronic communications data.201 With exact language, the
CalECPA addresses the probable cause and extraterritorial application
issues seen in Microsoft.202
CalECPA section 1546.1(d)(3) prohibits extraterritorial application of
government surveillance powers by requiring warrants issued under the
CalECPA to comply with the general constraints of search warrants.203
information is relevant to an active investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by
state or federal law.”).
197
See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that
granting an SCA warrant to obtain CSLI based on the specific and articulable facts standard
is not per se unconstitutional under the third-party doctrine); In re Application of U.S., 733
F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (mandating probable cause for a warrant to obtain CSLI).
198
See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding the Fourth
Amendment applies to email correspondence); Bowman, supra note 52, at 828 (describing
Warshak as an expansion of the Fourth Amendment for email communications).
199
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(1) (“The warrant shall describe with particularity the
information to be seized by specifying the time periods covered and, as appropriate and
reasonable, the target individuals or accounts, the applications or services covered, and the
types of information sought.”); § 1546.1(d)(2) (“A court shall issue such an order upon a
finding that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active
investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law.”); see also
Backer, supra note 18, at 396 (suggesting email communications are private and therefore
must be protected by a probable cause requirement consistent with the Fourth Amendment);
Shepard, supra note 100, at 424 (identifying inadequacies between the federal and state
constitutions).
200
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (applying the 180day distinction seen in the SCA to the email data requested by the government).
201
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (“A court shall issue such an order upon a finding
that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active
investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law.”).
202
See § 1546.1(d)(3) (“The warrant shall comply with all other provisions of California and
federal law, including any provisions prohibiting, limiting, or imposing additional
requirements on the use of search warrants.”).
203
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require the
disclosure . . . only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(3) (“The warrant
shall comply with all other provisions of California and federal law, including any provisions
prohibiting, limiting, or imposing additional requirements on the use of search warrants.”);
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CalECPA Section 1546.1(a)(1) establishes a presumption against
compelled disclosure of electronic communications information, but
allows the government to compel an ISP to turn over data under limited
circumstances.204 The exceptions provided under Section 1546.1(c) limit
the government’s ability to access the data itself or compel the ISP to
surrender it instead.205 However, similar to the SCA, the CalECPA does
not contemplate the geographic reach of its subpoenas capable of
accessing non-content data, such as sender and recipient information and
time logs.206 Courts outside of the Second Circuit may, like the lower court
in Microsoft, find no extraterritorial concerns, and continue to grant SCA
warrants, subpoenas, and court orders seeking content and non-content
data stored abroad.207 Conversely, if courts interpret Microsoft and the
see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“A magistrate judge with authority in the district . . . has
authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property located within the
district.”).
204
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the
disclosure . . . only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure”), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(1) (“Except as
provided in this section, a government entity shall not do any of the following: [c]ompel the
production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider.”).
Compelled disclosure under § 2703(a) does not require an ongoing criminal investigation,
while the CalECPA does. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(1). But see 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued . . . if
the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication . . . are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”).
205
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(c)(6) (“If the government entity, in good faith, believes
that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person
requires access to the electronic device information.”); § 1546.1(c)(7) (“If the government
entity, in good faith, believes the device to be lost, stolen, or abandoned, provided that the
entity shall only access electronic device information in order to attempt to identify, verify,
or contact the owner or authorized possessor of the device.”); see also Magid, supra note 19
(reporting the CalECPA restricts the government’s ability to compel disclosure of user data
consistent with the Fourth Amendment by requiring probable cause).
206
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(b)(4) (providing the government may compel production
of or access to electronic information from an ISP “[p]ursuant to a subpoena issued pursuant
to existing state law, provided that the information is not sought for the purpose of
investigating or prosecuting a criminal offense, and compelling the production of or access
to the information via the subpoena is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law”); see
also Shickich, supra note 48, at 461–62 (reviewing the non-content data such as search terms,
cookies, and IP addresses in Twitter’s record retention consent clickwrap form).
207
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, that has been in electronic storage . . . .”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(1)
(“Except as provided in this section, a government entity shall not do any of the following:
[c]ompel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service
provider.”); but see In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (likening
SCA warrants to subpoenas in that government agents do not physically travel to where the
data is stored).
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provisions of the CalECPA to prohibit extraterritorial application,
government requests for data would be subject to the geographic
limitations found within F.R.C.P. 41.208
Warshak, Microsoft, and the newly enacted CalECPA all show promise
to reinforce the privacy interests of U.S. citizens.209 Absent a showing of
probable cause, CalECPA generally prohibits required disclosure of
relevant materials to the government during an investigation. 210 Further,
the government would only be able to require disclosure by the ISP under
limited circumstances and not just because a certain email account is
under investigation.211 Finally, ISPs are not prohibited from providing
notice to the individual linked to the email account, except in certain
circumstances.212 Because the CalECPA offers improvements that resolve
both issues seen in Microsoft, Congress should revise the SCA with similar
language in mind.213

208
Compare In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 476 (finding the execution of the SCA
warrant does not extend the government’s reach beyond United States’s borders), with
Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 214 (2d Cir. 2016) (“When the government
compels a private party to assist it in conducting a search or seizure, the private party
becomes an agent of the government, and the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause applies
in full force to the private party’s actions.”); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“A magistrate
judge with authority in the district . . . has authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize
a person or property located within the district.”).
209
See Backer, supra note 18, at 397 (urging the Supreme Court to resolve the dispute
following Microsoft); Shickich, supra note 48 at 469 (stating courts treat non-content data as
existing within public space).
210
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (“A court shall issue such an order upon a finding
that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active
investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law.”); see also
Green, supra note 45, at 392–93 (offering the government may employ SCA warrants with
corresponding gag orders forbidding the ISP from providing notice of the search to the
individual associated with the stored data).
211
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c)
may be issued . . . if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”), with
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(1) (“Except as provided in this section, a government entity
shall not do any of the following: [c]ompel the production of or access to electronic
communication information from a service provider.”).
212
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.2(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, any
government entity that executes a warrant[] . . . shall serve upon[] . . . the identified targets
of the warrant or emergency access, a notice that informs the recipient that information about
the recipient has been compelled or obtained . . . .”).
213
See infra Part III.D (proposing amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
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D. A Proposed Solution to the Extraterritorial SCA Warrant
Establishing a general probable cause standard to compel disclosure
of content and non-content data would ensure that Americans freely
communicate with one another without fear of unwarranted government
surveillance.214 Because the CalECPA does not expressly address
extraterritorial seizure of stored communications data, language from the
F.R.C.P. would suffice in supplementing the outdated SCA.215 Including
these provisions would cure the extraterritoriality and standard of proof
woes seen in Microsoft, and thus, Congress should amend § 2703(d) to
mirror the more robust provisions of the CalECPA.216
1.

Amendment to SCA § 2703(d)

Scholars reviewing required disclosure of content and non-content
under the SCA recommend raising the minimum standard of proof to
probable cause.217 Further, scholars disagree with the extraterritorial
application of a seemingly domestic statute.218 A controlling statute with
a stricter standard of proof may have changed the course earlier on in
Microsoft.219
The proposed text would appear as follows:

214
See Backer, supra note 18, at 397 (describing limited privacy protections available to
email correspondence under the SCA); Langley, supra note 9, at 1658 (recommending that
personal health data be incorporated into the definition of contents within the SCA due to
the sensitive nature of personal health information).
215
Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(3) (“The warrant shall comply with all other
provisions of California and federal law, including any provisions prohibiting, limiting, or
imposing additional requirements on the use of search warrants.”), with FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(b)(1) (“A magistrate judge with authority in the district . . . has authority to issue a
warrant to search for and seize a person or property located within the district.”); see also
Shickich, supra note 48, at 464 (describing circumstances under which Twitter user’s noncontent data may be disclosed to law enforcement without a warrant).
216
See infra Part III.D (proposing an amendment to § 2703(d) of the SCA).
217
See Backer, supra note 18, at 397 (predicting the Supreme Court will take the SCA
standard of proof issue on directly); Schultheis, supra note 9, at 1453 (calling for a probable
cause requirement to compel disclosure of personal data from an ISP under the SCA
following the controversial leaks made by Edward Snowden).
218
See Backer, supra note 18, at 397 (suggesting that email users enjoy a reasonable
expectation of privacy); Schultheis, supra note 9, at 682 (claiming extraterritorial processing
of SCA warrants threatens the cloud computing industry on a global scale).
219
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding the structure
of the SCA sufficient to justify extraterritorial application); Matter of Warrant to Search a
Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829
F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that the SCA does not obligate Microsoft to disclose
email content data located in Ireland).
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d) Requirements for court order. A court order for
disclosure pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures
described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the
case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures),
under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court
that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue
only if the governmental entity offers specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other information
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation upon a finding that there is probable cause to
believe that the information is relevant to an active
investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state
or federal law . . . In the case of a State governmental
authority, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited
by the law of such State. A court issuing an order
pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by
the service provider, may quash or modify such order, if
the information or records requested are unusually
voluminous in nature or compliance with such order
otherwise would cause an undue burden on such
provider.220
2.

Commentary

The proposed amendment to the SCA recalibrates the relationship
between the government’s interest in prosecuting crime and the Fourth
Amendment privacy expectations of individuals. 221 Requiring a showing
of probable cause eliminates the ambiguous authority presented between

220
The proposed amendment above is the work of the author. The author wishes to add
text shown in italics, and remove existing text shown with strikethrough. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(a) (describing the technical limitations of SCA warrants); § 2703(d) (allowing required
disclosure based on specific and articulable facts); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (“A court
shall issue such an order upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the
information is relevant to an active investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by
state or federal law.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“A magistrate judge with authority in the
district . . . has authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property located
within the district.”) (emphasis added); Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10 (suggesting Congress
amend the SCA); Woods, supra note 87, at 781 (arguing that Congress must adjust the
jurisdictional reach of the ECPA and accommodate criminal or counterterrorism
investigations for foreign governments).
221
See supra Part III.B (analyzing apparent weaknesses within the SCA regarding the
standard of proof and extraterritorial application).
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the SCA and the F.R.C.P. in Microsoft.222 The proposed amendment also
includes language from the F.R.C.P. limiting the geographic reach court
orders and subpoenas issued under § 2703(d) while providing the
possibility for emergency exceptions.223 A requirement that the data in
question be stored within the issuing district along with an increased
burden of proof ensures the government may not exceed its constitutional
reach.224 These measures will have limited effects, however, because the
SCA is not the only federal statute currently authorizing government
surveillance of electronic communications with a standard of proof lower
than probable cause.225 Further, the CalECPA does not allow the
government to obtain information for criminal investigations using
hybrid search warrants.226 Because the CalECPA is currently untested in
the courts, it remains unclear whether its provisions will solve the issues
evident in Microsoft.227 State solutions such as the CalECPA would limit
state power, but not federal power due to the lingering SCA.228
The CalECPA, subject to limited exceptions, requires the government
to show probable cause in exchange for any warrant seeking to access
222
See supra Part III.C (discussing ambiguity within 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) as to whether the
geographic limitations of the F.R.C.P. apply to § 2703(a) and arguing a clearer definition
would aid courts in reviewing SCA cases).
223
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“A magistrate judge with authority in the district . . . has
authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property located within the
district.”). F.R.C.P. 41 also includes exceptions to its territorial limit. Id. For example, facing
threat of imminent bodily harm to an individual, the law enforcement may exceed its
territorial authority. Id. See also Walsh, Extraterritoriality, supra note 40, at 642–43 (providing
specific national security exceptions allowing courts to violate the presumption against
extraterritoriality).
224
See Backer, supra note 18, at 399 (arguing the SCA must be revisited by Congress due to
the problematic application of its provisions as seen in Microsoft).
225
See USA PATRIOT Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B) (2012) (stating to obtain a warrant to
seize foreign tangible things the government must produce “a statement of facts showing
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to
an authorized investigation”); Atkins, supra note 99, at 81 (arguing that the standard of proof
found in the PATRIOT Act must be raised to probable cause); Froomkin, @Snowden, supra
note 98 (lamenting that Congress made little substantive change to the majority of the
controversial and intrusive nature of the PATRIOT Act).
226
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (2016) (“A court shall issue such an order upon a
finding that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active
investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law.”).
227
See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (applying little
available case law relevant to extraterritorial application of the SCA).
228
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (“A court shall issue such an order upon a finding
that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active
investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law . . . .”) (emphasis
added); Zetter, supra note 101 (providing that five states have similar protections for data
content and nine have warrant protections for GPS data); Kelly, supra note 113, at 697
(musing the potential benefit of modeling an amendment to the SCA after the CalECPA).
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electronic information, including stored information.229 Regarding notice,
CalECPA warrants require notice to the individual as a default, subject to
certain exceptions.230 Current disagreement among courts in granting
SCA warrants for various types of information often boils down to which
authority the judge prefers.231 Further, Microsoft only expressly resolved
the issue of extraterritorial application as to SCA warrants, and not court
orders or subpoenas.232 If future trial courts grant SCA warrants for email
data without the government showing probable cause, the burden then
shifts on the appellate court to invalidate that warrant. 233 Of the proposed
textual amendments to the SCA, there is little scholarly analysis of the
appropriate standard of proof for non-content data.234 Adding twentyfirst century language to the SCA will more concretely alert courts as to
the reach of their court orders and subpoenas.235
Scholars propose alternatives relying on today’s often-catastrophic
legislative process to amend the federal SCA as displayed in F.R.C.P.
41(b)(6).236 While the government has a definite interest in gaining tools
to combat tech-savvy criminals, the language of F.R.C.P. 41(b)(6) is both
229
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(1) (“Except as provided in this section, a government
entity shall not do any of the following: [c]ompel the production of or access to electronic
communication information from a service provider.”).
230
See § 1546.2(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, any government entity
that executes a warrant[] . . . shall serve upon[] . . . the identified targets of the warrant or
emergency access, a notice that informs the recipient that information about the recipient has
been compelled or obtained . . . .”).
231
See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (granting an
SCA warrant to collect cell site information based on the specific and articulable facts
threshold is not per se unconstitutional under the third-party doctrine); In re Application of
U.S., 733 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (mandating a showing of probable cause for a
warrant to obtain CSLI); In re U.S. for Orders Authorizing Installation and Use, 416 F. Supp.
2d 390, 397 (D. Md. 2006) (holding probable cause was required for CSLI data).
232
See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 221 (2d Cir. 2016) (recalibrating the issue
of geographic limitations within the context of § 2703(a)).
233
See id. at 222 (reversing the lower court decision to uphold the SCA warrant).
234
See Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10, at 1235–36 (proposing amended text to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d) to resolve confusion with the ECS and RCS distinction before the standard of proof
and extraterritoriality debate seen in Microsoft). Kerr also suggests Congress further enhance
privacy protections to data in storage for more than 180 days. Id. at 1234.
235
See Shickich, supra note 48, at 464 (stating that according to the current SCA and case
law, judges may compel disclosure of non-content data from Twitter without obtaining a
warrant).
236
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (requiring that the government has “authority to issue a
warrant to use remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy
electronically stored information located within or outside that district”); see also Backer,
supra note 18, at 397 (urging the Supreme Court to avail email correspondence of Fourth
Amendment protection); Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10, at 1615 (advancing amendment to
the SCA to cure ambiguities between the ECS and RCS distinction).
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overly broad and vague.237 The phrase “electronic storage media” can be
construed to mean anything from a motion picture to the information
stored and transmitted via wearable health technology.238 Further, the
rule does not denote whether “outside” includes foreign territories or just
U.S. districts separate from the district issuing the warrant. 239 Finally,
while the proposed amendment would help in a situation where the
government knows that the individual is using technological means to
conceal the data’s location, granting a SCA warrant would still be based
on the “specific and articulable” facts standard of reasonable suspicion
contained in § 2703(d).240 While this proposed rule awaits approval,
United States courts will continue to review SCA warrants under the
evolving Microsoft paradigm.241 However, because § 2703(a) references
the F.R.C.P., this recent amendment should, in the interest in added
individual privacy, be revised.242 Instead, amending § 2703(d) of the SCA
to include an increased standard of proof and limit extraterritorial
application would comprehensively resolve the Microsoft conundrum in
one fell swoop.243
Others believe the Supreme Court, as in Katz, should set the standard
of proof for requiring disclosure of email data based on probable cause
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (providing the government has the “authority to issue a
warrant to use remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy
electronically stored information located within or outside that district”).
238
See Langley, supra note 9, at 1659 (summarizing data privacy expectations for wearables
as the same for any other stored electronic communications); Shickich, supra note 48, at 464
(observing that non-content data is readily subject to disclosure under the specific and
articulable facts standard of § 2703(d)).
239
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (adopting the government has “authority to . . . seize or
copy electronically stored information located within or outside that district”) (emphasis
added).
240
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic
communication . . . only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant
procedures . . . .”) (emphasis added); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (2016) (“[a] court shall
issue such an order upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the information
is relevant to an active investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or
federal law.”) (emphasis added); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (suggesting the government has
“authority to . . . seize or copy electronically stored information located within or outside that
district”) (emphasis added).
241
See Schultheis, supra note 9, at 689 (concluding concerns will not subside until Congress
updates data privacy legislation to match technology’s growing infrastructure).
242
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic
communication . . . only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . .”).
243
See supra Part III.B (examining the two issues posed in Microsoft regarding the
appropriate standard of proof and extraterritorial application of SCA warrants).
237
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and avoid Congress altogether.244 While a decision from the Supreme
Court would resolve the issue, this theory assumes that the Supreme
Court is ready and willing to offer blanket Fourth Amendment protections
to a relatively new form of potentially anonymous communication.245
Also, this theory requires a Court capable of handing down a definitive
answer to a controversial matter.246 A sweeping solution from the Court,
while possible due to the vacant seat on the Court left by Justice Antonin
Scalia, presupposes the Court granting certiorari to a case involving email
privacy and the SCA.247 Because it is possible the Court may also choose
to deny Fourth Amendment protections to email communications or defer
to Congress in enacting appropriate legislation, amending the SCA places
control of the future of email privacy rightfully with the legislative
branch.248
Taken together, perhaps the strongest reason to amend the SCA is the
undeniable reality that email usage today vastly differs from email usage
in the 1980s and requires commensurate legal protection.249 Content is not
limited to business communications as it now offers an intimate view of
an individual’s life.250 Emails can be sent from devices other than
computers from almost anywhere in the world. 251 Paradoxically,
244
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that communications
conducted in a public telephone booth deserve a reasonable expectation of privacy from
government surveillance); Backer, supra note 18, at 396 (arguing Congress has been reluctant
to update the SCA despite rapidly advancing technology, and thus, the Supreme Court
should tackle the issue instead).
245
See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (mentioning email and
other Internet communications often contain the most intimate information that the
individual wishes to keep private); Weinstein, supra note 99, at 249 (stating one way to avoid
law enforcement surveillance on the Internet is to use anonymization software, such as Tor,
that makes the user’s identity unknown to both the ISP and the government).
246
See Chait, supra note 31 (noting eight justices currently preside over the Court).
247
See Bowman, supra note 52, at 809 (noting Warshak was a 6th Circuit decision); Solove,
Justice Scalia, supra note 84 (arguing Justice Scalia notoriously believed searches of materials
provided to third parties do not violate the Fourth Amendment). Justice Scalia’s absence
means the Court may finally reign in the third-party doctrine and mandate Fourth
Amendment protections to email communications. Id. See also OYEZ, supra note 31
(conveying the Court decided Katz in a seven to one decision, with Justice Black dissenting
and Justice Marshall abstaining). The reasonable expectation of privacy advanced in Katz
did not require a five-four ruling. Id.
248
See Backer, supra note 18, at 401 (urging the Supreme Court to scale back the
government’s ability to seize data without proving probable cause).
249
See Schultheis, supra note 9, at 689 (concluding that concerns will not subside until laws
are updated to match our growing infrastructure).
250
See Langley, supra note 9, at 1658 (analyzing data privacy expectations for fitness
technology); Shah, supra note 9, at 540 (opining data submitted in relation to Facebook and
WhatsApp communications are subject to disclosure under the SCA).
251
See Daskal, supra note 9, at 366 (explaining the mobile nature of email and other Internet
communications).
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individuals today use the Internet regularly to share intimate information
globally with little to no regard for the government’s near-Orwellian
surveillance capabilities.252 Amending the SCA would attack the problem
at the source while leaving a choice amongst the states to do the same.253
For each of these considerations, it is imperative to equate our daily email
correspondence to the parchment papers to which the Fourth Amendment
refers.254
IV. CONCLUSION
In the din of modern existence, privacy stands to be one, if not the
most important, fundamental liberty in the twenty first century deserving
of a rigorous defense. Almost fifty years after Katz, communications
technology connects U.S. citizens on an ongoing basis. Since the name
Snowden became widely known, many scholars and individuals believe
that the Fourth Amendment nears obsolescence as the surveillance
powers of the United States government expand. Those left in peril are
ordinary U.S. citizens who rely on email communication for business or
personal reasons. To quell growing concerns over digital privacy,
Congress should amend the outdated structure of the SCA. Otherwise,
unchecked government surveillance power will induce the once vital
liberties afforded by the Fourth Amendment to wither away.
Returning to Frank’s situation, the government may only require
disclosure of Microsoft’s domestic data after proving probable cause, as
the language of the Fourth Amendment and the F.R.C.P. intend. With
greater privacy protections, U.S. citizens may freely and legally associate
online without unnecessary fear of government surveillance. ISPs may
too reap the benefits of the digital age, so long as they maintain an
acceptable balance between consumer protection and compliance with
legitimate law enforcement requests. While no legislation is perfect,
organic growth of case law surrounding the CalECPA should assist in
bringing communications privacy to the full attention of the legislature,
the High Court, and the American public. Well-reasoned and frequently
See Atkins, supra note 99, at 86 (examining the government’s wide surveillance powers
under the PATRIOT Act); Curry, supra note 105 (inquiring whether certain police forces are
obtaining warrants based on probable cause before using Stingray technology); Greenwald,
supra note 98 (revealing information provided by NSA analyst Edward Snowden in 2013 that
the United States government conducts mass dragnet-style surveillance on cell phone data
with the cooperation of numerous cell service providers without first seeking particularized
search warrants).
253
See supra Part III.B (summarizing constitutional privacy concerns that email users face
following Microsoft).
254
See U.S. CONST. amend IV (guaranteeing “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects”).
252
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tended legislation, like the CalECPA, may prove to be the loam in which
the roots of the Fourth Amendment receive new life.
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